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Abstract:	
In October 2015, President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.K, coupled with strengthened 
trade ties and diplomatic relations, has led observers to say that the U.K. is “China’s best 
western friend.”1 This is a departure from traditional great power relations, which has seen 
the U.K. and U.S. ally to promote and protect Western interests and philosophy in the 
international system such as a commitment to human rights, and which sees China as a rising 
threat. This new trend gives rise to this capstone project’s two research questions: (1) “Have 
China-U.K relations during Xi Jinping’s era strengthened, compared to Hu Jintao’s era?” 
And (2) Who is driving the change for a stronger relationship? In order to understand 
whether China-U.K relations have strengthened, this research project conducts a 
comparative analysis of China-U.K relations during Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s era.	In 
combination, this research project utilizes Putnam’s Two-level Game Theory to see who and 
what factors are driving the change for a stronger relationship.	This research project 
compares five different aspects of China-U.K relations; diplomatic relations, trade and 
economic investment, energy sector cooperation, and security relations. 
 							
																																																								
1 http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/xis-visit-to-kick-off-a-golden-age-of-china-uk-relations/ 
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Introduction 
 
In October 2015, President Xi Jinping’s state visit to the U.K, coupled with 
strengthened trade ties and diplomatic relations, has led observers to say that the U.K. 
is “China’s best western friend.”2 This is a departure from traditional great power 
relations, which has seen the U.K. and U.S. ally to promote and protect Western 
interests and philosophy in the international system such as a commitment to human 
rights, and which sees China as a rising threat. The strengthening and warming of 
China-U.K. relations will have major implications for great power relations in the 
international system. Closer China-U.K relations will provide China with more 
leverage and influence, and decrease U.S. leverage. Equally as important as the 
question of whether China-U.K. relations has strengthened, is the question of what 
factors are motivating the stronger relationship. To gain insight into these issues, this 
research project puts forward two research questions, (1) “Have China-U.K relations 
during Xi Jinping’s era strengthened, compared to Hu Jintao’s era?” (2) Who is 
driving the change for a stronger relationship?  
 
In order to understand whether China-U.K relations have strengthened, this research 
project conducts a comparative analysis of China-U.K relations during Hu Jintao and 
Xi Jinping’s era. This project has chosen to use the Chinese political leadership of Hu 
and Xi as a framework for analysis because Chinese leadership is characterized by 
distinct styles of governance, policy concepts, and most importantly, economic power 
as China has developed over time. For example, Hu’s leadership was considered the 
fourth generation, and consisted of academically trained engineers, which led to a 
new, technocratic style of governance, and more pragmatic policies that saw China 
‘going out’ into the international community in order to secure trade opportunities. In 
comparison, Xi is considered the fifth generation, and is characterized by the 
dominance of finance, management, and entrepreneurial figures in policy-making. Xi 
benefited from a stronger economy thanks to Hu’s policies, and engaged in bolder, 
more assertive policies. These two leaderships span 14 years to 2016 (the year this 
research project is conducted), therefore allowing a significant but focused period of 																																																								
2 http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/xis-visit-to-kick-off-a-golden-age-of-china-uk-relations/ 
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time to conduct research and comparative analysis on changes in China-UK relations. 
 
In combination, this research project utilizes Putnam’s Two-level Game Theory to see 
who and what factors are driving the change for a stronger relationship. Putnam’s 
two-level game theory proposes states (national policy makers in government) are 
influenced by two different levels of actors: international level actors and domestic 
level actors. International level actors include other states and international 
organizations; domestic level actors include divisions within government, political 
lobby groups such as unions, and domestic voters. These two levels may have aligned 
or rival interests, but the state is influenced by both levels when making decisions. 
Putnam’s two level game analysis is useful because it helps explain how changes in 
international relations (in this case, bilateral relations,) are the result of the interaction 
of different levels of actors, who have fluid and changing preferences and actions. 
This provides a more holistic analysis, and breaks the assumption that the state is a 
black box with set interests that are exempt from change and influence, or that 
international level actors and domestic level actors act in isolation.  
 
 This research project compares five different aspects of China-U.K relations:  
• Diplomatic relations 
• Trade and economic investment 
• Energy sector cooperation 
• Security Relations 
 
These four aspects have been selected because they cover key topics in economic, 
security, and political dimensions of China-UK relations. This allows the project’s 
analysis to have breadth and coverage of all three key dimensions of international 
relations, and depth for a detailed understanding of critical areas of relations. 
Diplomatic and security relations are also a critical area of bilateral relations, as they 
show the goodwill, dialogue, and cooperation (or lack of), that states have with one 
another. Trade and investment are critical as they are a key driving force for bilateral 
cooperation and show whether states are willing to be interdependent on one another, 
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or whether states are distrustful and have protectionist policies. Energy sector 
cooperation is a critical area of cooperation as it demonstrates high levels of trust; 
energy is vital for a state’s economy and security. For example, compromises to 
power supplies that cut off power to air traffic control facilities could cause planes to 
crash, and loss of lives. For one state to give another state the consent to build or 
invest in energy is a big indication of trust.  
 
This capstone project hypothesizes that China-U.K relations during Xi Jinping’s era 
have strengthened, compared to Hu Jintao’s era. China is the driving force behind the 
strengthening. Hu’s efforts for China to be more proactive and ‘go out’ into the 
international community in order to secure its economic interests, and taking on a 
more active role participating in regional and world affairs contributed much to closer 
relations with the UK. The success of Hu’s policies have grown China into the largest 
economy in the world, and with greater economic power, under Xi China has become 
more bold and assertive in the international community and is now taking its first 
leadership role as the founder of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). In 
response to China’s growth and active participation in the international community, 
the UK has sought to maximize the opportunities China provides. But without China’s 
efforts and economic power, the UK is unlikely to have such a strong relationship 
with China. This project is structured into four distinct parts. Part one looks at 
diplomatic relations, part two looks at trade and economic investment, part three 
looks at energy sector cooperation, and part four looks at security relations. 
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Diplomatic Relations 
 
Introducing the context and literature around the Dalai Lama effect 
 
Diplomacy in international relations is critically important for states to secure their 
interests. Diplomacy can contribute to economic trade and development, for example 
to sell a country’s commercial and cultural exports. It can be used to integrate a 
country into a global or regional grouping in order to achieve strategic foreign policy 
goals, for example to persuade ASEAN to accept a new member country, and from a 
neoliberal perspective, promote greater regional stability, security, and economic 
prosperity. It can be used to restore legitimacy and reputation in times of a downturn 
in foreign perceptions, for example after World War II Germany used diplomacy to 
gain acceptance and approval from other Western democracies and improve its 
standing and position. It is valuable to analyze diplomatic relations because as the 
international system has become more globalized and interdependent, diplomacy has 
become increasingly important as states are now more geopolitically intertwined on 
economic, political and security issues. 
 
In addition, it is valuable to analyze diplomatic relations because diplomacy provides 
the strategic advantage of allowing states to secure their interests without the use of 
violence and war. Diplomacy can persuade and attract other states to change their 
behavior without the heavy financial, political and social costs of weapons and 
soldiers that is required by war, and has limited consequences if it fails. Without 
informed, consistent and strategic diplomacy, states may compromise and undermine 
their interests. It follows that as a result, understanding a state’s public diplomatic 
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relations is informative and reveals how the state views the world, and how they view 
themselves in the world. A state’s diplomatic relations reveals whether they are 
willing to trust and cooperate with other states, whether they sit on the fence and are 
open to compromise with other states, or if they are distrusting, aggressive, and view 
the world as a zero-sum game. 
 
Since the Hu Jintao era, a new diplomatic tool has emerged and become increasingly 
common, pertinent and relevant in China’s relations with other countries: the Dalai 
Lama Effect. When states officially receive the Dalai Lama, the leader of the Tibetan 
community, this prompts the ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ from China, where China expresses 
its opposition by reducing trade (i.e. trade sanctions and non-tariff barriers) and 
cancelling political visits and meetings to (and from) other countries. The Dalai Lama 
effect was coined by Andreas Fuch and Nils-Hendrik Klann (2010), whom conducted 
a study to see if states whom receive and host the Dalai Lama systematically 
experienced bilateral diplomatic tensions in the form of trade and cancelled meetings 
with China. Fuch and Klann (2010 showed that when a state’s head of government 
met the Dalai Lama, their exports to China were reduced by 8.1 or 16.9 percent on 
average (depending on the estimation technique used).3 Previous research has shown 
that bilateral diplomacy plays an important role in trade relationships, for example 
Rose 2007 showed that the size of a state’s diplomatic service is positively correlated 
with its exports, with each additional consulate increasing exports from six to ten 
percent.4 Similarly, Nitsch 2007 showed that state and official visits increases trade, 
																																																								
3 Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, “Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International 
Trade,” Discussion Paper no. 113 for the Center for European, Governance, and Economic 
Development Research (October 2010), page 4 
4 Fuchs and Klann, “Paying a Visit,” 6 
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where one visit increases exports between eight to ten percent.5 
 
The Dalai Lama is a flashpoint because he is equated to the issue of autonomy for 
Tibet. The Dalai Lama is the leader of the Tibetan community, and advocates for 
political and religious autonomy for Tibet. The Tibet narrative maintains that “Tibet 
has always been independent, and Sino-Tibetan relations have been nothing more 
than a form of patron-priest relations, with little or no implication of country to 
country or state-to-state relations.”6 The Dalai Lama has also emphasized, “Tibet and 
China existed as separate countries. However, as a result of misrepresentations of 
Tibet’s unique relations with the Manchu Emperors, disputes arose between Tibet and 
the present Chinese Government.”7 In contrast, since 1951 China has asserted 
governing authority over the Tibet, based on historical claims that Tibet has long been 
a part of Imperial China.8 These two conflicting narratives have produced tensions 
about Tibet’s status. The Chinese leadership views the Dalai Lama as a threat to its 
cultural, religious, territorial and political authority in China and as an internal affair, 
thus rejects outside interference.9 
 
In contrast, in the international community states such as the UK, US, France, and 
Norway view the Dalai Lama is a human rights issue and have regularly hosted and 
shown support for the Dalai Lama. Aside from Fuch and Klann’s (2010) research, 
there is abundant anecdotal empirical evidence of the Dalai Lama effect. For example, 
in 2007 the US Congress presented the Congressional Gold Medal (the highest 
																																																								
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 4 
7 Andy Zhang, Hu Jintao: Facing China’s Challenges Ahead (Lincoln: Writers Club Press, 2002), page 
46 
8 Dawa Norbu, China’s Tibet Policy (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), page 2 
9 Fuchs and Klann, “Paying a Visit,” 2 
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civilian honor) to the Dalai Lama. US President George Bush and the US Congress 
stood to ovation and praised the Dalai Lama as a “hero of the Tibetan struggle.”10 To 
compound matters in the eyes of China, during the ceremony President Bush sat next 
to Dalai Lama and called on China to accept the Dalai Lama, stating that religious 
diversity is a “source of strength” “that is why I will continue to urge the leaders of 
China to welcome the Dalai Lama to China.”11 In response, China pulled out of, and 
forced the postponing of a multilateral meeting in Germany to discuss Iran’s nuclear 
program.12 The meeting was a high-level meeting composed of the five permanent 
members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council – the US, China, UK, France, 
Russia – and host Germany, to discuss the UN’s new resolution and sanctions against 
Iran.13 An official for the meeting acknowledged the diplomatic tensions, “they 
(China) had indigestion over the presence of certain spiritual leaders in the US.”14 In 
2008 French President and President of the EU at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy met with 
the Dalai Lama. Subsequently, China cancelled the 11th annual EU-China summit at 
short notice and postponed a billion-euro deal to purchase 150 passenger planes from 
Airbus.15 Chinese Foreign Minister Qing Gang stated, “we resolutely oppose the 
Dali’s separatist activities in any countries in whatever capacity, and contact with 
foreign leaders and him in whatever form.”16 
 
																																																								
10 “Bush and Congress honour Dalai Lama,” New York Times, accessed July 25, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/washington/18lama.html?_r=0 
11 “Dalai Lama all smiles as he receives congressional gold medal,” Fox News, accessed July 25, 2016, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/10/17/dalai-lama-all-smiles-as-receives-congressional-gold-
medal.html 
12 “China cancels Iran meeting over Dalai Lama,” Reuters, accessed July 25, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-iran-idUSN1537624920071015 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Fuchs and Klann, “Paying a Visit,” 10 
16 “Defiant Nicolas Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama despite China’s trade threat,” Telegraph, accessed July 
26, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3629865/Defiant-Nicolas-Sarkozy-
meets-Dalai-Lama-despite-Chinas-trade-threat.html 
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However, there is a gap in the literature on what domestic and national level actors 
influence the decision making process in China to use the Dalai Lama effect, and the 
decision making process in the UK over whether or not to receive the Dalai Lama. 
Previous research by Fuch and Klann 2010 reveals that China does penalize states for 
receiving the Dalai Lama, but does not uncover who influences and drives the 
decision to penalize states and why these interests penalizes states. Are National level 
decision makers dictating the Dalai Lama effect? Are the business interests who are 
part and parcel of the effect supportive of it or do they try to undermine the effect in 
their own interests? Are there any support groups within China that would oppose the 
effect and voice support for the Dalai Lama? How do these domestic actors influence 
China’s ability to successfully exert the Dalai Lama effect? Analyzing domestic level 
actors’ interest and influence behind the Dalai Lama effect is even more important as 
the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy is based on its performance of its 
promise to rejuvenate China’s national glory. 
 
This paper uses Putnam’s Two Level Game to analyze Sino-UK win-sets, in order to 
unlock the black box of actors and how their preferences and actions are fluid and 
change over time. In the context of the UK’s recent decision in 2015 to decline a 
meeting between Prime Minister David Cameron and the Dalai Lama, and the rhetoric 
advocating the UK as China’s best western friend, applying Putnam will also shed 
insights on what is driving on the UK’s relationship with China and how the UK 
positions itself in the world – which international and domestic actors influence 
national leaders’ decisions to respond compliantly with the Dalai Lama effect; does 
the UK tend to prioritize maintaining positive relations with China more, or does the 
UK prioritize championship of human rights and the Tibet cause foremost? This paper 
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is structured as three parts; part one discusses the win-sets during Hu and Xi’s 
leadership, and explores how domestic policies have influenced China’s foreign 
policy strategy, and whether Chinese private business interests have affected the win-
set and the efficacy of using the Dalai Lama effect. Part two discusses the win-sets 
during Brown and Cameron’s leadership, and explores how domestic policies have 
influenced the UK’s strategic relationship with China, and whether UK public 
sentiment have affected leaders’ decisions to comply or ignore the Dalai Lama effect 
and cooperation with China. 
 
Win-sets during Hu and Xi Leadership 
 
China’s win-set under Hu 2002-2012 
The actors and interests influencing Hu’s win-set is important as the Dalai Lama 
effect first appeared during Hu’s leadership. The most important actor is the President 
Hu Jintao. Hu’s win-sets were defined by his two major domestic and foreign policy 
strategies; the Socialist Harmonious Society policy (hereon referred to as Harmonious 
Society) and the Harmonious World policy. When Hu came to power, he inherited 
domestic and international realities fraught with challenges. China’s rapid 
socioeconomic development was so successful that China was labeled the ‘economic 
miracle’ and the ‘factory of the world,’ however this modernization had produced an 
increasingly divided and unequal society, regional disparities, structural poverty, 
corruption and environmental concerns. This produced calls from all corners of 
Chinese civil society to address these social and political ills. In response, the Hu 
leadership officially adopted the ‘socialist harmonious society’ policy at the 17th CPC 
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Congress in October 2007.  	
Meanwhile, on the international level, Hu inherited a China that was passive in the 
international community and historically, and had abstained from asserting leadership 
in international affairs. Chinese scholars and international relations policy experts 
were increasingly questioning China’s long-standing low-profile foreign policy 
strategy set by Deng Xiaoping, of “hiding one’s capacity while biding one’s time,” 
and “not seeking to lead.”17 Chinese scholars and policy experts pushed for China to 
take on more proactive diplomacy and stronger soft power, and provided two key 
arguments on why this was necessary. Firstly, there was intense domestic debate that 
began in 2004, just as Hu entered office, that China should assume a position in the 
world that is commensurate with its status as a rising major power.18 Interviews 
conducted with leading Chinese scholars revealed that the scholars believed the 
conventional low-profile strategy was now more constraining than beneficial as it 
compromised China’s ability to promote soft power. Adherence to principles such as 
strict non-interference meant that China did not intervene to help solve problems in 
Sudan and Myanmar.19 The international community heavily criticized China for not 
being more proactive in these situations.20 
 
Policy experts such as Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences deputy director Huang 
Renwei also argued that soft power was necessary to complement and strengthen a 
state’s hard power and in turn, its ability to secure its interests.21 Soft power was 
viewed as indispensable. “If hard power is a constant value, soft power should be a 																																																								
17 ‘Harmonious Society’ and ‘Harmonious World’: China’s Policy Discourse Under Hu Jintao, page 2 
18 Chinese Soft power and its implications for the u.s, 18 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 19 
21 Huang Renwei, “Soft Power and National Security,” Xuexi Yuekan, January 2003. 
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variable or multiplier, which could magnify comprehensive power or significantly 
weaken it.”22 Support from policy and scholarly experts contributed to Hu’s decision 
to adopt a ‘harmonious world’ policy, which was officially announced at the 60th 
anniversary of the United Nations. In practical terms, the Hu leadership believed the 
harmonious world policy, which aimed to increase China’s cooperation with other 
states and role in international affairs (essentially China’s soft power) in order to 
strengthen China’s ability to secure economic interests, would also support its 
domestic counterpart, the harmonious society policy. Given that trade accounted for 
seventy percent of China’s GDP, the rationale was that increasing and improving 
China’s international trade ties would also promote domestic economic growth and 
development.23 
 
Following the announcement of the harmonious world policy, a white paper was 
issued on China’s peaceful development policy, which was a complement to the 
harmonious world policy and outlined the means to achieve a harmonious world (the 
ends).24 The white paper articulated five key means; countries should (1) respect each 
other and treat each other as equals, (2) engage in economic cooperation and make 
economic globalization a win-win process that benefits all countries, (3) respect the 
cultural diversity, (4) engage in security cooperation (5) engage in environmental 
cooperation to protect the Earth.25 These ideas reflect a neoliberal worldview that 
stimulating economic and security interdependence will increase the benefits of 
cooperation and costs of conflict, therefore states are less likely to engage in conflict 
																																																								
22 Huang Renwei, “Soft Power and National Security,” Xuexi Yuekan, January 2003. 
23 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges (New 
York: M. E. Sharpe, 2006), preface 
24 “Overview on China-UK relations,” Chinese Embassy, accessed July 25, 2016. http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zygx/introduction/t693272.htm 
25 Ibid. 
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with one another. In practical terms, these policy ideas have manifested into increased 
and strengthened trade relations, greater involvement and a more proactive role in 
international institutions and affairs, and increasing dialogue with other states. For 
example, from 2002 China has been the strongest advocate of the China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Area which stands as the largest free trade area in terms of population and third 
largest in nominal GDP.26 In addition, China has actively increased its involvement in 
the UN, believing that the UN is a core channel for handling international affairs, 
especially for setting authoritative, generally-accepted principles for governing 
international relations, and promoting harmony, coordination, and win-win spirit in 
international relations.27 By 2008 China had expanded its contribution to UN 
operations 20-fold, providing more peacekeeping staff than three other members of 
the Security Council (UK, US, and Russia.)28 29 
 
Under Hu’s leadership, China’s positioning of itself enabled Sino-UK dialogue and 
cooperation. The U.K and China conducted a series of high-level visits and 
diplomatic dialogues (the majority geared towards economic relations). During Hu’s 
leadership the two sides shared 17 high-level visits involving high-level political and 
diplomatic actors such as the President, Premier, Vice Premier of the Hu government, 
and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Foreign Secretary David Miliband and William 
																																																								
26 “China and Asean free trade deal begins,” BBC News, accessed July 25, 2016. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8436772.stm 
27 “Overview on China-UK relations,” Chinese Embassy, accessed July 25, 2016. http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zygx/introduction/t693272.htm 
28 “China’s Expanding Peacekeeping Role, ” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
accessed July 25, 2016. http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/jan09 
29 Although China’s involvement in international organizations and affairs such as ASEAN and the UN 
are not policies directed solely at the UK and/or do not always directly involve the UK, as the UK is 
one of the major powers in the world and a major actor in the international community (i.e including 
but not limited to the UK being a significant trading partner, a hub for knowledge and technology 
transfer, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council), all of China’s policies indirectly 
impact the UK, therefore it is important to discuss China’s major diplomatic efforts and how the UK 
has positioned itself in response to these efforts  
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Hague, as well as the Royal Family such as Queen Elizabeth II and Prince Charles. 
Hu’s positioning of China and the subsequent diplomatic visits contributed to 
achieving the establishment of a strategic partnership, a joint statement, one G8 and 
two G20 summits, and two China-U.K. economic financial dialogues.30 One of the 
most significant diplomatic developments was in 2004, when Premier Wen Jiabao 
visited the U.K. and established a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with a 
“pledge to work together to develop this partnership to benefit our countries and to 
help create a safer, more prosperous, and open world.”31 Subsequently, the strength of 
China and the UK’s emerging partnership was reiterated in the U.K’s first white paper 
on its engagement strategy with China; the number one aim of the U.K.’s response is 
“getting the best for the UK from China’s growth, it is about securing the greatest 
global value.” The UK white paper also revealed that China’s efforts to promote itself 
as an cooperative and willing member of the UN was successful, as the white paper 
shared the sentiment to “to consolidate and strengthen cooperation in multilateral on 
issues of mutual and international concern.”32  
 
Hu’s Contradictory Policies? 
Given Hu’s interest in repositioning China to strengthen its international role and 
Hu’s efforts to strengthen diplomatic relations and dialogue, at first glance it seems 
contradictory that Hu would execute the Dalai Lama effect as it harms his previous 
foreign policy efforts. Yet Hu has stood firm on the Dalai Lama effect; in 2009 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated that refusing to meet the Dalai Lama should be 
one of the “basic norms of international relations” for any country “interested in 																																																								
30 “Overview on China-UK relations,” Chinese Embassy, accessed July 25, 2016. http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/zygx/introduction/t693272.htm 
31 “China-UK Joint Statement,” Chinese Embassy, accessed July 25, 2016. http://www.chinese-
embassy.org.uk/eng/wjzc/zygx/t101947.htm 
32 “China-UK Joint Statement.” 
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preserving its ties with China.”33 During Hu’s era, the Dalai Lama effect had already 
started shaping China-UK relations. In 2008, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
broke tradition with his predecessors who all received the Dalai Lama at 10 Downing 
Street, and instead received the Dalai Lama at Lamberth Palace, home of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, giving the impression that he was meeting the Dalai Lama 
as a religious figure only. In addition, Brown was careful to inform Premier Wen 
Jiabao of the meeting before making it public.34 This was seen as a concession to 
China. In 2012, when Prime Minister David Cameron met the Dalai Lama, again 
broke tradition and was held instead at St Paul’s Cathedral,35 with Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg stating “Our position on Tibet is long-standing and clear: we 
regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China.”36 
 
Why has Hu been able to use the Dalai Lama effect to successfully shape Sino-UK 
relations in favor of China, and without jeopardizing previous Chinese foreign policy 
efforts? The Dalai Lama has been successful because it is subtle; it is not officially 
declared, it is implemented without formal law, unilateral, limited in terms of sectoral 
application, scope and duration.37 Because the Dalai Lama effect is not an officially 
declared policy, law or regulation (either domestically or internationally), it is hard 
for states or international organizations such as the WTO to prove its existence and 
undermine it. In addition, the unilateral nature of the Dalai Lama effect means that 																																																								
33 “China, Dalai Lama and Frogs,” Prague Security Studies Institute, accessed July 25, 2016. 
http://www.pssi.cz/publications/blog/7-china-the-dalai-lama-and-frogs.htm 
34 “Brown agrees to meet Dalai Lama,” Financial Times, accessed July 25, 2016. 
https://next.ft.com/content/84fac3bc-f5e0-11dc-8d3d-000077b07658 
35 “David Cameron must apologise,” The Independent, accessed July 25, 2016. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-must-apologise-for-meeting-dalai-
lama-to-restore-diplomatic-relations-with-china-8606341.html 
36 “David Cameron must apologise.” 
37 Xianwen Chen and Roberto Javier Garcia, “Economic sanctions and trade diplomacy: Sanction-
busting strategies, market distortion and efficacy of China’s restrictions on Norwegian salmon 
imports,” China Information vol 30, no. 1 (2016): 30 
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China has full control over its punishments, it can use non-transparent political 
measures such as applying non-tariff barriers to disadvantage UK exports, or cancel 
diplomatic meetings at will. Typically, the Dalai Lama effect is limited in terms of 
which trade sector they affect – in Norway, China’s non-tariff barrier only affected 
Norway’s salmon exports to China while in the Philippines, China’s barriers only 
increased the difficulty for Philippines to export fruit to China.38 
 
Fuch and Klann support this, arguing that the Dalai Lama effect is limited in scope 
and duration, as the sanctions and barriers target symbolic exports that signal China’s 
opposition and displeasure (often machinery as it is a product many countries export 
to China), and after two years, the effect wears off.39 This is in line with Chen and 
Garcia’s finding (2016) that these measures are “typically intended to signal the 
Chinese Government’s displeasure regarding some event rather than cause serious 
long-term economic injury to the foreign country in question, (and) signal China’s 
frustration and serve as a warning of stronger retaliation if a country does not reverse 
a certain action or make an official gesture to improve relations.”40 The unilateral and 
non-transparent nature of the effect enables Hu to stop or reverse the effect at will in a 
face-saving manner, after states have complied with China’s wishes. Because of these 
advantages, Hu has been able to adopt the Dalai Lama effect as a regular diplomatic 
tool in China’s toolbox, and use it to successfully shape the behavior of foreign states, 
including the UK. Chen and Garcia (2016) concur that “China has become more 
confident and more skilled in the statecraft of economic sanctions, and this point has 
to be taken seriously.”41 The Dalai Lama effect “demonstrates that China is capable of 																																																								
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exercising long-term statecraft, and that it has become more assertive in international 
relations.”42 The fact that despite China’s coercive use of the Dalai Lama effect, 
China has quite successfully strengthened economic ties suggests China is likely to 
continue using the Dalai Lama effect without costs to its key interest - trade. From 
2002 to 2010, intraregional exports between China, ASEAN, Japan and Korea had 
increased from 34% to over 50%.43 Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore were also 
injected US110 billion, 60 billion, 35 billion, US31 billion of foreign direct 
investment in China (respectively).44 With economic growth from regional trade 
partners, China also reciprocated economic cooperation and invested in the Southeast 
Asia; after the US, China was the second largest investor of FDI in the Southeast 
Asian region.45 In 2010, China signed the China-ASEAN free trade agreement, the 
largest free trade agreement in the world, which made China the leading trade partner 
for ASEAN.46  
 
The role of Chinese private business interests 
However, although Hu’s national level leadership supports the Dalai Lama effect, one 
critical group of actors that shows opposition to the effect are private business 
interests. When the Dalai Lama effect applies non-tariff barriers such as tighter 
regulations for foreign exports, this hurts private business interests thus they engage 
in ‘sanction-busting.’ Chen and Garcia’s research (2016) found that when faced with 
together regulations which impose negative flow-on effects that decrease the 
profitability of their goods and increase their business costs, Chinese private business 
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interests engaged in ‘busting’ the Dalai Lama effect; in other words private business 
interests actively engaged in their own strategies to mitigate the sanctions around their 
products. 
 
Chen and Garcia conducted anonymous and confidential interviews in China and 
Hong Kong with private businesses regarding China’s imposition of the Dalai Lama 
effect on Salmon exports. China had implemented a non-tariff barrier by tightening 
inspections and quarantines of imported salmon and requiring salmon imports to 
arrive in China before being eligible for import licenses, while each application for an 
import license took 20-25 days.47 As a result, private Chinese businesses experienced 
delays getting their salmon to the end market, while salmon quality also degraded as it 
began to rot.48 To ‘bust’ this sanction, business interests engaged in several strategies 
including selling fresh salmon to smoked salmon processors (as the quality was too 
poor to be sold as fresh salmon), engaging in legal trans-shipments (importing salmon 
to Hong Kong or Vietnam first and then re-exporting salmon to China) and illegal 
trans-shipments (falsifying country-of-origin certificates for salmon and avoiding the 
tighter inspections and licenses), and importing salmon through smaller ports in China 
where it was less common to find the new inspection procedures therefore avoiding 
it.49 The interviewed business interests admitted that they “were working every 
channel to minimize delays from inspections,” but willing to go to lengths to ‘bust’ 
the Dalai Lama effect, including a willingness to distort China’s salmon market and 
engage in deceptive practices such as selling degraded salmon, illegal shipping, 
falsifying documents smuggling.50 From 2002 to 2011, UK exports to China have 																																																								
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grown rapidly to quadruple to £12.5 billion.51 19 percent of UK exports are machinery 
and electrical goods, while 16 percent are raw materials;52 given that around 60 
percent of China’s total imports are machinery and raw materials,53 both private UK 
businesses that export these goods to China, and Chinese businesses that import these 
goods, will have a strong interest and incentive to ‘bust’ the Dalai Lama effect if it 
affects their business performance. 
 
However, currently there is a lack of primary and secondary data on which specific 
UK businesses and their Chinese counterparts have attempted to ‘bust’ the Dalai 
Lama effect due to the political sensitivity of the subject, therefore the lack of 
transparent and available information about private business interests in Sino-UK 
sanction-busting is a challenge in determining how big a role they play in 
undermining the effectiveness of the national leadership’s decision to execute the 
Dalai Lama effect. Nonetheless the empirical evidence strongly suggests that private 
business interests are a key actor that influences the efficacy of the Dalai Lama effect. 
To increase the efficacy of the Dalai Lama effect, China could penalize business 
interests engaging in sanction-busting, however China appears unwilling. One of the 
private business interests interviewed by Chen and Garcia (2016) believed “the 
Chinese government has been aware of the trans-shipments from Hong Kong and 
Vietnam, but it has simply ignored them.”54 This again reaffirms the argument that 
China uses the Dalai Lama effect for political and diplomatic purposes to send a 																																																								
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strong message to other states.55 In the Hu era, although private business interests 
tempered the efficacy of the Dalai Lama effect and found ways to circumvent the 
effect in order to continue business, their actions ultimately did not compromise the 
Dalai Lama effect’s intended purpose. 
 
The role of Chinese public sentiment 
Civilians and public sentiment is often a strong and credible force in analysis using 
Putnam’s two level game, however as China’s government is not elected, autocratic, 
and exerts tight state control over all media channels, it is rare to get strong public 
sentiment on politically sensitive issues such as Tibet and the Dalai Lama. In 2008, 
when violent anti-government protests erupted in Tibet between ordinary Tibetans 
and Chinese police officers, in a notable exception, 29 individuals released an open 
letter criticizing authorities handling of the protests.56 The letter suggested that the 
Chinese government should stop violent suppression, political investigation, and 
political revenge on Tibetans and instead, allow journalists and the UN to carry out an 
independent investigation of the unrest and protests.57 The letter argued that an 
independent investigation would clarify that Dalai Lama supporters instigated the 
unrest, which would enable China to safeguard national unity.58 However, this was an 
exception to the rule, and by and large there is limited open public sentiment opposing 
the Chinese leadership’s decisions regarding Tibet and the Dalai Lama effect. Instead, 
in the aftermath of the Tibet protests, public sentiment was angry about “what it sees 
as a pervasive bias toward Tibet and disrespect of China in the Western media.” 
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China’s win-set under Xi 2013-present	
When Xi came to power, he inherited a China that, after three decades of reform, was 
the largest economy in the world. However China was no longer achieving double-
digit growth figures as it did during the 1990s and 2000s, and despite the Hu 
leadership’s proactive harmonious society policies there were still large economic, 
social and geographic disparities across China. In addition, although the Hu 
leadership had strengthened China’s position in the international community, China’s 
new assertive role was faced with new geopolitical challenges, including increased 
tensions in the South China Sea, hardening of North Korea’s stance, increased 
terrorism in Central Asia, and an increasingly active US presence due to the East 
Asian pivot or rebalancing.59 As a result the Xi leadership’s win-set was defined by 
the same key goal: to increase and distribute wealth to ensure social stability 
domestically, and to strengthen and promote China’s role (especially in Asian affairs) 
and trade ties internationally. In practical terms, Xi pursued a path of continuity and 
built upon Hu’s policies, the only major difference is Xi’s assertiveness and boldness 
as a leader in consolidating the CCP’s power in China, and China’s power 
internationally. 
 
Xi’s major domestic policy was known as ‘the Chinese dream.’ Xi described the 
Chinese dream as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” China analyst Bill 
Bishop sums up the Chinese dream as the common dream of all Chinese people for 
“national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction 
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of a better society, and military strengthening.”60 The Chinese dream is a departure 
from previous domestic policies because its rhetoric placed a greater emphasis on the 
individual, whereas previous policies such as Hu’s harmonious society and even Jiang 
Zemin’s Three Represents theory promoted the idea of betterment for society as a 
whole and placed greater emphasis on society as the unit of policy focus. The Chinese 
dream’s individualistic rhetoric reflects the rise of complaints, unrest and instability at 
the grassroots level about social inequalities and inequities in China, and is the Xi 
leadership’s response that they will continue to work to improve the welfare of all 
citizens, not only the upper and middle classes and urban classes but also those in the 
country side. This shift in rhetoric is significant as it reveals a legitimacy problem in 
China. Historically, the CCP and its leaders have relied on “cult of personality” to 
maintain legitimacy. The Maoist period saw the rise of leadership that relied on the 
individual leaders’ revolutionary personalities and popularity to legitimize their rule. 
As a result, power was over-concentrated in the individual leaders and their followers, 
who enjoyed virtually unbridled power. 
 
The role of legitimacy of the CCP 
However, modern Chinese leadership faces increasing legitimacy issues and now 
relies on performance to legitimize their rule. Without revolutionary leaders that 
project a cult of personality, Chinese leaders including Xi now seek to increasingly 
institutionalize the CCP, move away from ideology, and embracing performance-
oriented legitimacy. The role of the CCP was no longer a revolutionary party but a 
ruling party, where leaders had to maintain and enhance the performance of the CCP 
in improving economic and social development of China. Xi faced particularly strong 
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pressure from public sentiment because of the Bo Xilai incident in 2012 immediately 
preceding his ascension to power. Bo was a member of the powerful politburo, Bo 
and his wife were involved in the murder of UK businessman Neil Heywood, and 
subsequently charged with corruption, bribery, and abuse of power, and received a 
life sentence.61 However, details of the incident are ambiguous and have not been 
independently verified, and commentators have spectated the scandal was more 
political than criminal.62 Wang (2014) calls this the “most significant political crisis 
Beijing has faced since 1989. It exposed internal party struggles and policy debates 
within the CCP.”63 With the Bo Xilai incident receiving severe criticism from the 
public and fresh on the public’s mind, Xi’s win-set at the domestic level was defined 
by greater pressure and impetus to ensure the growth and betterment of China’s 
economy and social welfare. 
 
Continuity and strengthening of China’s peaceful development 
This domestic pressure translated into strong impetus for the Xi leadership to build 
upon Hu’s international strategy, and continue strengthening China’s role and 
economic ties internationally using the charm offense; neoliberal economic 
interdependence. Xi and Li Keqiang have continued building regional economic trade 
ties, at the 2013 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting and East Asia 
Summit meeting, China signed deals worth billions of dollars.64 It was also at the 
APEC meeting that Xi proposed the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank 
(AIIB), a multilateral development bank that will provide loans to finance 
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infrastructure across Asia.65 The bank was unprecedented as it is China’s first decisive 
effort to take a leadership role in the international community. Given that Asia has an 
$8 trillion infrastructure investment deficit, where areas of Asia rich in resources and 
human labor are undeveloped because basic infrastructure such as electricity, roads, 
and telecommunications are absent, the AIIB can provide investment to promote 
economic growth and development. 
 
Stimulating economic growth and development in Asia will produce new suppliers 
and open up new markets, which is a positive economic net benefit for the region and 
globally. This also increases economic integration and interdependence, which in turn 
increases the benefits of peaceful cooperation and increases the costs of conflict. As a 
result, states are less likely to go to war and fight, and peace and regional stability is 
promoted. Regional political stability is a significant advantage, as Asia is a 
flashpoint for instability due to a melting pot of different regime types, strong 
nationalist sentiments, unstable regimes, conflicting historical memories, and 
territorial disputes among other factors. Xi has emphasized that the AIIB is an 
initiative on China’s part to take more leadership and responsibility in the 
international community, to produce win-win situations for all states. “China will 
propose the AIIB with a view to jointly seizing opportunities and meeting challenges 
for the benefit of common development and prosperity.”66 Jin Liqun, President of the 
AIIB, also reaffirms the AIIB is China’s charm offensive, “China’s idea comes from 
its own experience. Infrastructure development has paved the path... China has 
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managed to lift 600 million people out of poverty. Now China is more developed and 
can afford to provide financial resources to other developing countries in Asia, it is 
our turn to do something for the rest of Asia, and in a certain sense, for the rest of the 
world.”67 
 
The AIIB charm offensive appears to be successful, as states such as the Philippines 
and Vietnam, who have territorial disputes with China have nonetheless joined. Both 
are founding members of AIIB. Critics criticized that the AIIB is a challenge to 
existing multilateral development banks such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank and the US western philosophy and agenda that dominates 
existing development banks, however despite strong US disapproval and vocal calls 
not to join the AIIB, states that are traditionally US allies such as the UK, Australia 
and South Korea, have joined. Thus far, the AIIB reflects that on the international 
stage, Xi has pursued continuity of Hu’s neoliberal, business-based foreign policy 
initiatives. The exception is that Xi’s policies are more bold and assertive, reflecting 
modern China’s greater economic power and leverage. Xi has continued 
strengthening bilateral trade partnerships, being an active and cooperative participant 
of ASEAN, APEC and various regional summits, and now is ‘going out’ into the 
international community and taking a leadership role for Asia’s economic 
development. China’s role and bargaining power in Asia is no longer limited to its 
domestic market’s buying power in trade or its supply of the world’s “factories”, but 
has expanded to China’s founding ownership of an international institution that can 
influence and increase economic development and integration, and help create and 
shape new norms of cooperation and connectivity in the Asian region, and heavily 																																																								
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increase China’s soft power and image in Asia and the world. 
 
In addition, Xi’s foreign policy rhetoric echoes Hu’s peaceful development policy, as 
it continues to emphasize mutual economic benefits using language such as a “win-
win strategy of opening up” and that China will “hold high the banner of peace, 
development, cooperation, and mutual benefit... unswervingly follow the path of 
peaceful development and firmly pursue an independent foreign policy of peace.”68 In 
the context of Xi’s geopolitical challenges (increased tensions in the South China Sea, 
increasingly active US in Asian affairs due to the East Asian pivot), Xi’s foreign 
policy rhetoric sends a strong message opposing the US’s philosophy and agenda in 
the internationally community; China emphasizes cooperation in contrast to US 
hegemony; peaceful rise and development and mutual benefit in comparison to US 
power politics and interventionism, bandwagoning and rebalancing (with the 
Philippines, South Korea, Japan).69 To be more clear, the 18th Party Congress Report 
stated that “we are firm in our resolve to uphold China’s sovereignty, security and 
development interests and will never yield to outside interests.”70 Under Xi, China’s 
foreign policy strategy has taken on a clear, principled with both soft and hard lines as 
it provides soft incentives for peace and cooperation, but hard and tangible 
punishments such as official rebukes and the Dalai Lama effect. 
 
Shaping UK relations with the Dalai Lama 
Xi’s clear and principled foreign policy rhetoric has actually seen a reduction of the 
use of the Dalai Lama effect against the UK, as the UK has taken cues from China 
and self-censored their relationship with the Dalai Lama. Xi was officially installed as 																																																								
68 “The Chinese Dream: Concept and Context,” page 49 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
27		
President in March 2013, which coincided with a major trade visit from UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron. Cameron’s visit to China was originally planned for April, 
but it was abandoned and postponed after Cameron met with the Dalai Lama. 
Ultimately, Cameron’s March visit to Beijing saw the UK changing their stance on 
the Dalai Lama and distancing UK interests from the Dalai Lama. 10 Downing Street 
provided insight, saying that the Beijing “visit is forward looking. We have turned the 
page on that (Dalai Lama) issue. It is about the future and how we want to shift UK-
China relations up a gear.”71 Cameron also announced that he had “no plans” to meet 
the Dalai Lama again.72 This was widely seen as the catalyst for friendlier Sino-UK 
relations, which has remained the case as Cameron has not met the Dalai Lama 
again.73 In 2014, Cameron visited China again, while Premier Li Keqiang came to the 
UK the same year, and President Xi made his first state visit to the UK in 2015.74 In 
2015, the UK again snubbed the Dalai Lama. The UK’s self-censorship of its 
relationship with the Dalai Lama evidences that Xi’s clear, principled approach with 
soft incentives and hard rebukes has been effective at influencing and shaping the 
UK’s decision to meet the Dalai Lama.  
 
 
Part Two: Win-sets during Brown and Cameron Leadership 
 
UK’s win-set during Hu: Brown 2007-2010 
The national level leadership on the UK side, during Hu’s leadership, was led 																																																								
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predominately by Gordon Brown. When Brown came into office, he inherited a 
domestic reality defined by the global financial crisis. As a result, Brown had a strong 
incentive to boost trade ties with China. Brown’s intention to boost trade with China 
and foster closer relations is evident in the growth of bilateral partnerships and 
agreements such as the first ever “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the first UK 
white paper on its engagement strategy with China where the number one aim of the 
Sino-UK relations was articulated as “getting the best for the UK from China’s 
growth, securing the greatest global value.”75 The comprehensive strategic partnership 
also reiterated similar themes, stating a “pledge to work together to develop this 
partnership to benefit our countries and to help create a safer, more prosperous, and 
open world.”76 The strategic partnership emphasized the Brown leadership’s desire to 
increase economic relations with China, and create more prosperity but does not 
utilize Hu’s harmonious world rhetoric. This emphasizes that the Brown leadership 
were willing engage in the economic opportunities China presents, but did not share a 
willingness to identify itself in the harmonious world envisioned by China. A closer 
look at the areas of cooperation highlighted in the partnership reaffirms the narrow 
and economically interested motives behind the Sino-UK partnership; the strategic 
partnership articulates three areas to consolidate and strengthen the bilateral 
relationship: (1) increase exchange of high-level visits, (2) intensify cooperation in 
broad areas of trade and investment through the Joint Economic Commission, (3) 
increase cooperate on in areas of science, technology, education, culture, and 
environmental protection. 
 
What was different about Brown’s maneuvering of Sino-UK relations is that he 																																																								
75 “China-UK Joint Statement.” 
76 Ibid. 
29		
promoted trade ties with China even at the cost of making concessions regarding the 
Dalai Lama and Tibet. Unlike his predecessors, in 2008 Brown broke tradition and 
met the Dalai Lama at Lamberth Palace. This was seen as a concession to China, 
especially compared to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In the months before 
Brown met the Dalai Lama at Lamberth Palace, Merkel met the Dalai Lama in the 
Berlin Government Office which gave the impression she was meeting the Dalai 
Lama in his capacity as a visiting head of state.77 Subsequently, Germany experienced 
the Dalai Lama effect when China cancelled a number of bilateral meetings with 
Germany. The contrast between UK and German approaches to China and the Dalai 
Lama is sharpened by both states’ responses to the anti-government protests in Tibet. 
In 2008, weeks before Brown’s scheduled meeting with the Dalai Lama, anti-
government protests in Tibet erupted into violence and was reported as the “fiercest 
protests in 20 years”78 The protests emerged out of Tibetan frustration with the lack of 
progress in talks between the Dalai Lama and Chinese leadership.79 Tibetan protesters 
wielded iron bars while Chinese armed police fired water cannons and teargas, police 
cars, fire engines and security vehicles were set on fire.80 Despite the discord, 
Brown’s leadership went ahead and made concessions in their meeting arrangements 
with the Dalai Lama to make the meeting more palatable for China. In comparison, 
Germany suspended plans for high level talks saying that talks “were hardly 
imaginable while violence in Tibet continues,”81 
 
The role of UK public sentiment 																																																								
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One of the key interests that factor into the UK win-set is domestic public sentiment. 
As a country with a commitment to civil and political rights, to democracy, freedom, 
and rule of law, and as part a responsible power, the UK’s domestic constituency has 
actively supported causes for human rights. In the eyes of UK public sentiment, the 
Tibet question is not about China’s internal sovereignty but rather of Tibetan’s 
freedom to basic human rights such as freedom of religion. One of the key actors that 
influences public sentiment and organizes ways to express public sentiment about 
Tibet, is Free Tibet, a non-profit non-government organization. Free Tibet who 
campaigns for a “free Tibet in which Tibetans are able to determine their own future 
and the human rights of all are respected.”82 To achieve this, Free Tibet mobilizes 
active support for Tibet and challenges human rights transgressions against Tibet and 
challenges China’s occupation of Tibet.83 In the aftermath of the 2008 Tibet protests, 
which coincided with the London leg of the Beijing Summer Olympics torch run, 
Free Tibet and other pro-Tibet groups such as Students for a Free Tibet organized 
pro-Tibet protests.84 
 
Thousands of pro-Tibet supporters showed up at the 31-mile route of the Olympic 
torch run to protest China. Two anonymous activists explained that they felt China 
was simply using the Olympics as a propaganda campaign to cover up its “appalling 
human rights record,” “like many people in the UK we feel China has no right 
parading the Olympic torch in London.85 Matt Witticase, a Free Tibet campaign 
spokesman, said “so many people turned out to show their solidarity with the people 
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of Tibet and their plight, and to expose as propaganda China’s claim that the torch 
relay is a journey of harmony.”86 However, the protests weren’t without incident as it 
came to a standstill due to standoffs between pro-Tibet and pro-China groups and due 
to pro-Tibet supporters running onto the relay track.87 There were multiple attempts to 
steal and extinguish the torch including one protestor who tried to steal the torch and 
screamed at television cameras “I urge you Gordon Brown, listen, free Tibet,” and a 
total of 35 protesters were arrested.88 
 
It is worth noting that in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Tibet protests, before 
the mass protests at the torch relay, Brown boycotted the opening ceremony of the 
Olympic Games in China and would only attend the closing ceremony. Brown was 
the “second major world leader” after Germany’s Merkel to boycott the opening. 
Speaking on the partial boycott, a UK Foreign Office spokesman said “We are 
encouraged by the progress China has made in recent years, although we of course 
want to see further advances. But backing China into a corner is not a productive way 
of promoting respect for human rights in Darfur, Timor, or Tibet – it would be 
counterproductive.”89 The partial boycott can be seen as an attempt to appease 
negative domestic public sentiment about the protests. UK Liberal Democrat leader 
Nick Clegg concurs, Brown’s boycott was a “belated U-turn, when he only does the 
right thing late in the day when he is forced to do so by public opinion.”90 This 
reveals that faced with pressure from public sentiments about the Tibet question and 
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the Dalai Lama, the Brown leadership would compromise and make symbolic 
gestures to appease public sentiment (in this case the boycott of the opening 
ceremony), but ultimately the Brown leadership believed it was in the UK’s interests 
not to boycott the entire Olympic ceremony, and that it was in the UK’s best interests 
to continue building a stronger economic partnership with China. In the aftermath of 
the London torch relay protests, the Chinese ambassador to London confirmed that 
Sino-UK relations would suffer if there was finger-pointing and blame, saying “the 
Western media’s demonization of China could lead to a backlash.”91 
 
 
UK’s win-set during Xi: Cameron 2010-2016 
When Cameron was elected into office, it was during a time of financial uncertainty, 
the threat of a global recession, and of public criticism over the UK’s foreign policy 
almost blindly following US decisions.92 As a result, Cameron’s win-set was defined 
by the need to promote economic growth and reduce public debt, and to improve the 
UK’s role in the international community. In 2010 Cameron inherited significant 
fiscal deficit due to Brown’s inefficacy. Under Brown, when he was elected into 
office in 2002, public sector net debt was £307.1 billion (29 percent of GDP), but by 
the end of his tenure in 2007 public sector net debt had grown to £512.9 billion (36 
percent of GDP).93 The hole in the UK’s public finances was the “largest in peacetime 
history.”94As a result, Cameron’s political narrative regarding the economy was that it 
was the ‘age of austerity,’ and proposed a deficit reduction plan that involved the 
tightest settlement of public spending and the tightest squeeze on NHS spending since 																																																								
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the 1960s and 70s.95 By 2011, consumer price inflation had risen to 4 percent whereas 
Cameron’s coalition government had aimed to keep inflation to 2 percent.96 Basic 
necessities such as gas and food prices were the principal source of inflation, 
meanwhile average earnings of UK citizens had only increased by 1.8 percent while 
unemployment for youth and graduates (16 – 24 year olds) had increased by 1.5 
percent from 66,000 unemployed 965,000.97 The economy was at risk of stagnating. 
 
Against this economic backdrop, Cameron had significant domestic pressure to foster 
economic growth for the UK. This resulted in Cameron adopting a plan to 
“rebalance” the economy by using investment-, export-, and private sector-led 
recovery.98 However, Britain’s traditional markets, the European Union and the US, 
are experiencing a financial crisis and the most severe public debt since the end of 
World War Two.99 In contrast, China is switching from investment-driven to 
consumption-driven economy, so British firms can expect a bigger market in 
China.100 One of the most imperative projects that British firms want to get a hold in 
is building a new nuclear supply plant. To fulfill election promises to boost 
sustainable economic growth, Cameron seeks to expand infrastructure construction.101 
The UK would benefit from both Chinese capital and technology for a nuclear 
plant.102  
 
Against this context, it is unsurprising that throughout Cameron’s tenure, he has kept 																																																								
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a distance from the Dalai Lama in order to appease China and secure business and 
trade opportunities with China. In 2012, Cameron met the Dalai Lama at St Paul’s 
Cathedral to present him the Templeton Prize and subsequently, China reacted by 
postponing a major trade visit by the UK to China.103 When the trade visit eventually 
happened later in 2013, 10 Downing Street released an announcement that strongly 
signaled whose corner they wanted to be in; “We want to deepen our relations with 
China and indeed we already are – UK exports to China grew faster than any of our 
main European partners last year. We strongly believe it is in the interests of both 
countries to manage our differences with respect, our position on Tibet is 
longstanding and clear: we regard Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China.”104 
In 2015, during Xi’s first state visit to the UK, one of the major achievements reached 
was China taking a 33.5 percent stake in a £18 billion nuclear power station in the 
UK. Britain also expects China to invest in other projects, including a high speed 
railway. Under Cameron, Britain has also established new visitor visas for Chinese 
tourists, the visas are valid for two years whereas usual visitor visas have a six month 
limit. Cameron’s efforts to keep Chinese tourists on the map is due to the fact that 
they contribute £500 million a year to the UK economy, and have high growth 
potential as between 2014 to 2015, the amount of Chinese tourists going to the UK 
increased by 35 percent.105 Downing Street has officially explained that “the visitor 
visa will enable them to maximize their spending power. Every 22 additional visitors 
create an additional job in the tourism sector.”106 Overall, Cameron has announced 
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that Xi’s 2015 visit secured £35 billion of trade and investment deals, and will create 
over 3,900 jobs in the UK.107 
 
The role of national interests 
Cameron also faced public pressure to deviate from Brown’s foreign policy. Under 
Brown, the UK’s foreign policy had been too ‘warlike’ and ‘lacked humility and 
patience’ as it favored the use of force by bandwagoning with traditional allies such 
as the US in international affairs.108 Cameron argued that by following the US in 
practically all foreign policy decisions, the UK risked “maximum exposure with 
minimum influence” in international affairs.109 As an alternative, Cameron has 
advocated for foreign policy that is more independent of the US, saying “we will 
serve neither our own, or America’s, nor the world’s interests if we are seen as 
America’s unconditional associate.” Cameron has advocated for foreign policy that 
focuses on national interest, where he announced “our national interest is easily 
defined. It is to ensure our future prosperity and keep our country safe in the years 
ahead. It requires our economy to compete with the strongest and the best, our full 
and active engagement in world affairs.”110 Cameron’s foreign policy strategy sees 
the UK adopting a realpolitik worldview. The UK’s win-set is defined by tangible 
national interests such as wealth and security, and given the slow economy, it is in the 
UK’s national interest to ally itself with China in order to strengthen its economy. 
 
From a realpolitik perspective, the UK’s decision to be one of the first Western states 																																																								
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to sign up to the AIIB, and the first traditional US ally to sign up to the AIIB, is 
rationally because it promotes the UK’s self-interest Although joining the AIIB 
weakened the diplomatic relationship between the UK and the US, with the US 
heavily criticizing the UK for “constant accommodation of China,”111 the UK secures 
the opportunity for British firms to secure contracts for construction and supply of 
steel and other exports. This is significant as the UK’s factories have massive 
overcapacity and could produce up to 30 percent more than the current demand for 
steel, coal, and building goods and services for AIIB infrastructure projects.112 
 
In addition, from a neoliberal perspective, as a member the UK has the ability to 
influence and shape discussions and norms within the Bank, rather than being locked 
out of the system. Although there is still public opposition to Cameron’s new policy 
not to meet the Dalai Lama, and public opposition against warming up to China 
because of China’s human rights record, given that China’s economy and military are 
now bigger than the UK’s, it is more constructive for the UK to persuade China on 
these matters through cooperation, interdependence, and friendship than through 
posturing and political grandstanding. The UK’s decision to gain China’s trust and 
cooperation on trade and the AIIB has been successful so far, with Xi Jinping stating 
that he hopes China-UK relations will reach “new heights,” and become a 
“community of shared interests.”113 The Chinese media and public sentiment has also 
been won over, saying that it is now a new era of “win-win results.”114 Given that the 
next opportunity from China is which state becomes the AIIB’s regional office, the 																																																								
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UK, if it follows its realpolitik strategy, is unlikely to meet the Dalai Lama in the near 
future. 
 
From Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, both presidents’ win-sets have been defined at the 
domestic level, by the need to secure economic growth and development in China to 
remedy unequal and inequitable development gaps in society. This was important to 
maintain social stability, as modern leaders and governments now rely on 
performance-oriented legitimacy to legitimize their rule. The shift of emphasis on 
Hu’s harmonious society as the core political unit and unit for policy focus, to Xi’s 
Chinese dream for every individual shows that over time, the need to legitimize CCP 
rule using performance has increased. In turn, each successive leader’s need to secure 
economic growth and development has increased. This is the motivating impetus 
behind China’s decision to ‘go out’ into the international community and secure trade 
cooperation, with China’s assertiveness to go out increasing over time. Hu relied on 
establishing bilateral or participating in multilateral trade relationships, and to 
preserve China’s image and improve cooperation, Hu advanced China using soft 
power through the “peaceful development” policy. In a similar vein, Hu has preferred 
to use soft power to disincentive states from meeting with the Dalai Lama and other 
behavior that openly criticizes China and threatens China’s authority and sovereignty. 
 
The advantage of the Dalai Lama effect, inherent in the fact that it is a soft power 
initiative so it does not involve conflict or war and is much less costly (compared to 
engaging in fighting). A second advantage explains why China has used it so 
confidently and without fear of backfiring; it is unilateral, not officially declared, and 
non-transparent which enables it to be subtle and easily reversible once states have 
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complied with China’s wishes, without risk of undermining China’s core economic 
interests. The Dalai Lama effect has been effective at shaping other states’ behavior, 
as by Xi’s era, the UK, Asian states and European states except the US and major 
allies such as Japan and South Korea, all avoid meeting the Dalai Lama in the 
interests of cooperating with China on trade opportunities. The recent success of the 
AIIB is evidence of states’ preferences to support China in a leadership position in the 
Asian region, even though there has been much vocal criticism from the US that 
China is challenging current multilateral development banks and the Western 
philosophy and agenda that underlies the current banks. These trends suggest that 
China-UK relations have been driven by China’s economic opportunities that it 
offers, more than any other factor. The UK has simply been pragmatic in seizing the 
opportunity to cooperate with China. 
 
Analyzing the UK win-set reveals that during Gordon Brown’s era, the UK made 
concessions in meeting the Dalai Lama in the interest of doing business with China, 
but did not avoid him altogether due to strong public sentiment favoring the Dalai 
Lama (as demonstrated by the Olympics torch run). During Brown’s era, the UK’s 
economy was slightly larger than China’s. In contrast, by Cameron’s era, the 
international and domestic backdrop had changed dramatically. China’s economy was 
three times the size of the UK’s, China had capital that was much needed by the UK 
for infrastructure and energy projects at home, and while China’s economy was 
forecast to continue growing under initiatives such as the AIIB, the UK economy was 
stagnating and could not be helped by its traditional US or European markets who 
were also suffering financial crises. Cameron pursued a policy of economic 
pragmatism, and although there is still public discontent about the UK’s closer ties to 
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China, Cameron has taken a realpolitik worldview of the UK’s role in the 
international community. As a result, the UK has prioritized deficit reduction and 
security as its key national interests, and actively strengthened its relationship with 
China. Although observers, such as the Dalai Lama, have criticized the UK for 
compromising their morality for money,115 a neoliberal perspective discounts the 
efficacy of posturing and political grandstanding. Instead, a neoliberal perspective is 
more optimistic that greater cooperation and interdependence with China may 
actually be more constructive, promote dialogue and enable both China and UK to 
jointly shape future relations for mutual benefit. 
 
 
Trade and investment during the Hu and Xi administration 
 
While Chinese foreign investment was initially focused on strategic sectors and 
natural resources and was focused on neighboring Asia, the second wave of 
investment was focused on US assets and started around the turn of the 
millennium116.This second wave of Chinese investment in the US has, however, 
received sometimes strong opposition from both the public and Government in the US 
and has led to a number of blocked bids by Chinese companies wanting to acquire US 
companies or bid on infrastructure assets and tenders such at telecoms117. Under Xi 
the investment focus of Chinese SOE’s appears to have been refocused more towards 
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Europe and specifically the UK and Germany118. David Cameron at the same time has 
been very vocal about accepting and fostering Chinese investment not just into less 
strategic sectors such as real estate but also into strategically important sectors such as 
energy, telecommunication and infrastructure. A column written by David Cameron 
in the Guardian in 2013 highlights: 
 
“We want to see China succeed. Whether it is welcoming China's investment in our 
nuclear energy sector, or creating a western hub for the Renminbi in the city of 
London, we believe that the right way forward is openness, dialogue, trade and 
investment; working together for mutual benefit not against each other in a zero-sum 
game.”119 
 
This open cooperation between China and the UK which has been fostered by both Xi 
and Cameron as seen in the recent visit of Xi in London. Xi stated in an interview 
with Reuters. 
“I hope this will chart the course for the future growth of China-UK relations, inject 
new impetus in practical cooperation between our two countries in all fields and 
enable us to jointly usher in a "golden time" for China-UK comprehensive strategic 
partnership.”120 
 
Given the assertive rhetoric towards the United States, the South-China Sea disputes 
and competing interests in Asia one may suspect that under Xi, China is trying to 																																																								
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diversify both trades and investment to become less dependent on the US and Asia. 
Ian Johnston, nevertheless argues that China’s assertiveness under Xi is mostly a 
continuation of polices started already under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, with 
exclusion of the South-China Sea121. 
 
At the same time a stronger alliance with the United Kingdom can indeed be mutual 
beneficial for both China and the UK. China may be able to weaken the traditional 
US/UK alliance, diversify its trade and investment, gain a strong foothold into the 
European market and lastly may use the UK to broker deals and mediate with the US. 
The UK at the same time drives its own goals of achieving more political power 
within the EU and the World by being a strong partner of China. It comes as no 
surprise that the UK is strongly advertising Chinese investment at the time were they 
may leave the European Union, following the vote to leave the European Union 
(“Brexit”) in June 2016. A strong Chinese relationship may enable the UK to 
negotiate a better deal for it either as a member of the EU or gives a stronger 
negotiating position to enable the same single market access it currently enjoys 
following the Brexit. It is important to highlight though that China has been a vocal 
opponent of a Brexit122. 
 
China’s growing interest in Europe can be seen looking at investment and trade 
figures. Investment into Europe, and especially into France, Germany and the UK, has 
increased exponentially during the last five years and has overtaken foreign direct 
investment (“FDI”) by China in the United States (USD15bn in the United States vs. 																																																								
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EUR20bn in Europe in 2016). The UK alone has accounted for c. EUR5bn in Chinese 
FDI123. In addition, it needs to be highlighted that the share of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) investing into Europe and the UK is significantly higher than in the 
US. While only 20% of Chinese FDI was driven by SOEs in the US, the EU’s and 
UK’s investment share of SOEs was over 60%124. It is however somewhat difficult to 
assess how much private company’s investment is driven by the Chinese leadership, 
as even private companies can be indirectly controlled by the Government125. As 
Norris states the Chinese leadership at least partially depended on commercial private 
companies to perform investment: “As such, if the state seeks to manipulate the 
security externalities stemming from various types of economic interaction and this 
economic interaction is being conducted on a day-to-day basis by commercial actors, 
the state must face up to the challenges of working through a proxy—namely, the 
commercial actors.” He states foreign Governments are concerned about the role of 
the state in private and state controlled companies. At the same time, however, these 
companies have economic interest which may clash with the interest of the state126. 
The above numbers have therefore be viewed with caution and may not be fully 
reflecting of all the investment decisions driven by the Central Government.  
 
The picture looks somewhat different when looking at trade. In international trade the 
US is by far the biggest single trading partner of China, only lacking behind the 
combined EU market127. Looking at the UK alone even when weighted based on the 
																																																								
123 Rhodium Group, China Investment Monitor, February 2016 
124 Rhodium Group, China Investment Monitor, February 2016 
125 US International Trade Commission, China: Description of Selected Government Practices and 
Policies Affecting Decision Making in the Economy, Inv. 332-492, P C8, Dec 2007 
126 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft, “Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State 
Control”, Cornell University Press, 2013 
127 National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Yearbook 2015, “11-6 Value of Imports and 
Exports by Country (Region) of Origin/Destination” (2016) 
43		
relative size of both the US and UK economy, the UK is significantly behind the US 
in trade with China (2% vs. 13%)128. Even if the relative trade volumes have not 
significantly changed since the warming of the relationship between the UK and 
China and Xi and Cameron it is reasonable to look at other metrics to see whether 
Chinese trade and investment with the UK can change future global politics and 
impact US’s status as key trading partner and UK position within the European 
Union. David Cameron has openly invited China to take part in strategic projects such 
as HS2 (the new high-speed railway link between London and the north), Nuclear 
Power and Telecommunications129. While other European countries have been open 
to Chinese investment in similar sectors the US has blocked Chinese investment into 
perceived strategic sectors. Can the increased economic cooperation start a new 
strategic partnership between China and the traditional US ally UK? How did and will 
domestic concessions, organizations and the public opinion shape the future 
development, can Putman show and explain decision making patterns? Is it a hedge 
against US power on the background of rising tensions? Or is China keen on using the 
UK as a diplomatic tool to bring the US at the negotiating table? The following 
sections will examine both Chinas and the UK’s win-sets under Hu and Xi to explore 
and forecast future development of Chinese investment and trade with the UK. 
 
Win-sets during Hu and Xi leadership 
When looking at the Chinese win-set one should highlight that given the limited 
amount of domestic constituencies the leadership of the CCP has to report to, or 
appease to, the win-sets should be viewed with caution as they assume that the 
leadership does take public opinion into account and cannot control information 																																																								
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access and distribution through official channels or controlled media130. Nevertheless, 
especially on the economic side the growing strength of Chinese private companies 
needs to be taken into account as they act both as intermediary for the state but also 
follow their own economic targets and interests131. At the same time online forums 
and message programs may act as a constituency of the people that are not 
represented in the leadership and lead to an increased speed in information flow that 
may influence the win-set132. For the following win-sets it should therefore be 
assumed that the leadership of China is limited by or influenced by public opinion. 
Recently in addition to public opinion the Chinese private business have become a 
more powerful voice in promoting economic policies. Many of Chinese top-business 
leaders are part of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 
and can lobby politicians during the meetings of the CPPCC and influence economic 
policies133. In the CPPCC Chinese business interest are represented both by the All-
China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
and invited business leaders such as Chairmen from SOE like Sinopec, China Unicom 
and China National Aviation Holding Company but also private companies like 
Baidu, Sina and China Power Holdings134. 
 
Chinese Win-set 
 
Macro-Economic backdrop during Xi and Hu leadership 
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Economic and trade policies and decisions of both leaders should be evaluated under 
the backdrop of the Macro Economic situation in China, which differed significantly 
under Hu and Xi. The economic fortunes of China influence both the domestic 
dimension of the leader’s win-set, in the form of perception of future outlook of the 
population and public opinion, as well as the international dimension in form of 
currency fluctuations, trade barriers, raw material prices and availability and necessity 
and demand for export and import for goods and services amongst others. 
 
Graph 1: GDP Growth p.a. during Hu and Xi leadership135 
 
Despite navigating China through the global financial crisis (GFC) between 2008-
2012 Hu Jintao was leading China through a period of sustained high growth between 
2003 and 2012, with first signs of a slowdown in this last years of leadership. While it 
had little direct effect on Chinas GDP growth, the GFC to this date shows some 
enduring effects in mainly Europe and the US – China’s key export and investment 
markets with a share of 31% of Chinese Exports in 2015136. Total trade with Europe 
stood at 18% of Chinese trade while the US was responsible for 13%137. The UK, 
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while most prominently featured in the recent news was only accountable for 2% of 
total trade with China, circa half the value of Germany.  
 
Xi one the other hand inhabited an economy in slowdown driven by global lack of 
demand following the above mentioned GFC. Especially Europe, as China’s biggest 
trading partner, is still feeling the aftermath of the crisis and is, with some exceptions 
showing slow growth rates, low domestic demand and high unemployment138. At the 
same time conflicts with the US over the leadership in the APAC region following a 
more assertive China made navigating for Xi more difficult then under Hu139. The 
Chinese economy and the leader Xi needed to find ways of decreasing dependence on 
the single US market as the second biggest trading partner and find new markets of 
growth as the Chinese economy is moving towards a time of lower demand for the 
products from the main trading partners US and Europe. 
 
China’s win-set under Hu 
When he took office in 2002, President Hu and his administration circle’s key priority 
was to tackle China’s increasing domestic inequalities and imbalances which have 
been mounting during China’s strong growth in the 1990s and early 2000s in the 
Jiang Zemin era. However, by the beginning of 2007, after the unexpected and sudden 
collapse of Western export markets following the GFC, Chinese leaders decided to 
refocus on maintaining economic growth, no matter how unevenly wealth was 
distributed in the Chinese society. Hu’s leadership plans to decrease taxes on farmers 
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and target and build-out social welfare were quickly abandoned as the party was 
hoping that, by keeping the economy growing at a fast level it could, at least for that 
time, stay away from the lower income class increasing anxieties by lifting 
everybody’s economic fortunes and tackle the income inequality at a later stage once 
the GFC has been successfully fend off. Therefore, following this change in policy, 
Hu’s leadership focused on increasing investment within China to make up for the 
slowdown of trade with its key trade partners US, Europe and Japan. Given the lost 
focus on reducing poverty and income imbalances at the end of Hu’s presidency 
China remained at a per capita income similar to the one in Cuba and Namibia. The 
spread of average incomes was even more telling. While Shanghai showed a per 
capita income of $12,000 a year. Residents of Guizhou, China’s poorest 
province, earn a mere $2,500 a year140.  
 
On the international stage, when Hu took office, he avoided confronting the US and 
other Western countries as China’s geostrategic position did not allow it to act too 
assertive at the begging of his presidency. Therefore, Hu was driving policy 
adjustments to concur with the fact that the US is dominating the international system 
and was the key driver for China’s modernization efforts through investment. In the 
relations with other Asian countries, Beijing tried to create a peaceful regional 
environment to foster its own economic development.141 
 
China has weathered the GFC better than most of the Western countries, following 
the above mentioned policy change, despite the cost of growing imbalances. 																																																								
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Correspondingly it overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy which 
allowed Hu to drive the Chinese foreign policy towards a more assertive tone with a 
focus on China’s core national interests.142 China’s continuous strong economic 
growth during Hu’s leadership and the GFC not only further elevated social and 
economic tensions but also increased expectations of the performance of the central 
government.143  
 
In 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao stated that: “China remains a developing country despite 
remarkable achievements and its modernization will take a long time and the efforts 
of several generations.”144 This statement reflects the enormous economic 
achievements and growth during the Hu period but also the mounting challenges that 
Hu faced or has partially generated following the GFC. Based on the strong domestic 
economic growth, driven by internal investment, but increasing imbalances within the 
country Hu spent less time focusing on promoting trade and investment relations with 
the UK or other countries. This is not least shown by the fact that Hu visited the UK 
only once in 2005 during Gordon Browns reign in the UK145. Given the inward focus 
of Hu’s government, trade and investment policies and initiatives developed rather 
slowly and only increased in the final years of its leadership. Only by 2010 trade and 
investment significantly increased as the Hu leadership reset its focus on international 
polices146.  
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Following China’s economic dependence on foreign trade and investment the win-set 
for Hu was nevertheless big. Hu had to ensure a quick recovery of Chinese trade with 
ailing western countries and support Chinese SOE’s expanding globally to further 
bolster Chinese growth to distract especially lower classes from the growing 
inequalities. Hu faced less resistance from members of the CCP given the focus to 
overcome problems in the domestic economy. Following the model of the CCP of 
“legitimacy through economic performance”147. Similar to its predecessors, and the 
Xi government, the Hu administration kept the currency artificially low to support 
exports and appease business groups148. 
 
China’s win-set under Xi 
When Xi took office in 2012, he took over control of an economy that has been 
slowing down the previous two years, despite state intervention, while imbalances 
between rural counties and cities where at an all-time high. At the same time China 
under the late Hu has become more assertive and Xi, to have legitimacy as Chinese 
leader, faced with a weakening economy, needed to follow up on the push to foster 
Chinese core interests and increase Chinese strength within the region, which led to 
conflict with many of China’s key export markets149. Xi therefore had to tackle three 
problems at the same time. A slowing economy, decreasing relations with key 
markets and high domestic imbalances. In order to increase potential markets for 
China but also to increase its political power and to gain privileged access to market 
Xi started a number of initiatives to advance Chinese interests like the Asian 
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Infrastructure Investment Bank, the One Belt One Road Initiative and RECP. In 
addition, Xi and Premier Lei Keiqanq are fostering reform of the SOE and trying to 
enable private investment in SOEs and increase international competiveness150. This 
act was and still is however met with resistance from the conservative and left wing 
within the CCP, “who consider that public-ownership is the main body of 
socialism”151. 
In the big picture, the win-set under Xi remained unchanged, i.e. enabling and 
fostering international trade to advance or at least stabilize growth of Chinese exports. 
However, under Xi the needed reforms and geo-political changes added international 
investment and entry for SOE’s in new markets as a new key focus. This could also 
trigger a decreasing dependence on the US market and the local market on the 
equation of the win-set. Xi’s win-set was further influenced by the blocking of 
investment in many sectors of the US economy by the US Congress given distrust in 
Chinese SOE and concern about national security152. With the investment opportunity 
closed in the US for many strategic SOE like natural resources and 
telecommunications, Xi and its leadership needed to find other established markets to 
market test Chinese SOE on the global stage. In summary while Xi’s win-set for 
negotiations with the UK was negatively influenced by internal politics in the CCP 
and the growing income disparity, at the same time it increased through the pressure 
to find markets for SOE’s to invest and to globalize further trade. In addition, for Xi, 
the UK and specifically London is a valuable partner to internationalize the Chinese 
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Currency Renminbi given that London is one of the key financial hubs in the world153. 
Lastly Xi needs partner for its Chinese lead institutions to challenge the US, the entry 
of the UK into the AIIB was a first step154. 
 
UK Win-set 
 
UK win-set during Hu leadership time (Brown 2007-2010) 
Gordon Brown become Prime Minister in 2007 and was more or less immediately 
faced with the GFC, which had enormous impact on the UK with London being one 
of the most important financial centers in the world and responsible for c. 15% of 
national output and 11% of tax income for the UK155. Faced with slow GDP growth in 
2008 and negative GDP growth of -4.3% in 2009156, Brown tried to broker a deal to 
foster more investment from the Chinese State investment fund, however even in 
2011 Chinese FDI stood at only c. USD 500m157. Brown was focused on winning 
Chinese investment to bolster Infrastructure spending, create jobs and at the same 
time gain easier market access to China for UK companies. In 2008, Brown set a 
target of GBP 60bn investment by 2010, a target missed by a wide margin 
(cumulative investment between 2002 and 2015 stands at EUR15bn)158. On the 
background of an ailing economy after the financial crisis the win-set for Brown was 
big as any agreements that brought or increased Chinese investment and trade would 
have had a positive impact on the economy. Brown’s win-set was however impacted 																																																								
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by negative views on Chinese politics and investment both within his own Labour 
Party, trade unions and the European Union which he had to take into consideration. 
It is important to highlight that, unlike Blair, Brown tried to further integrate the UK 
into Europe and the European decision making process as a normal partner and foster 
trade within the EU159. Nevertheless, the closer ties and pro-Europe stance of Brown 
influenced the flexibility in dealing with China and negatively impacted the win-set as 
the EU was pushing to be an ethical actor in international trade and investment and 
highlighted for example human right questions. Any future investment and trade was 
likely negatively impacted by for example demonstrative acts like the “boycott” of the 
Olympic Opening Ceremony in Beijing in 2008 by Brown and other EU leaders160. 
This smaller win-set however did not seem to have positively impacted negotiation 
outcomes for Brown or fostered trade and investment during his short period as prime 
minister. 
 
UK win-set during Xi leadership time (Cameron 2010-currently) 
Cameron was elected in 2010 and 2015 partially because of the slow economic 
recovery seen under Brown. His election promises included creating jobs, backing 
businesses and modernizing and building out infrastructure161. As highlighted in his 
meetings with Hu and Xi in 2010 and 2015 respectively Cameron and his 
conservative party are actively promoting and supporting Chinese investment in the 
UK162. Unlike Brown, Cameron has no or limited opposition to this policy and 
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therefor can act more freely on trade and investment with China163. In addition, 
Camron tries to be less influenced by the EU and is playing the BREXIT scenario to 
broker a better deal for the UK. While the Chinese administration has publicly stated 
that UK is better placed within the EU, Cameron could use the increasing Chinese 
investment to hedge against the impacts of a possible UK exit from the EU.164  
Given the stretched domestic finances in the UK after the GFC, Cameron is especially 
dependent on Chinese investment in Infrastructure and Energy as the recent UK 
budget commits the administration to produce a surplus from 2018. Therefore, during 
the recent visit by Xi in 2015 the two sites brokered a deal including Chinese funding 
of Britain’s fist new nuclear plant in Somerset and funding of the HS2 construction. 
In addition, Chinese companies hold shares in strategic holdings like Thames Water 
or Heathrow Airport165. Lastly the continued and strong investment from China and 
London as RMB trading hub can further bolster the significance of London as an 
international finance hub in the fierce competition of global financial centers. A key 
focus for Boris Johnson, the current major of London and key figure in the 
conservative party. 
 
As seen above Cameron with looser ties to the EU and backing by his own party and a 
definite need for investment and trade has a significantly bigger win-set than Brown. 
Yet despite this, under Cameron the UK as far more successful in attracting Chinese 
FDI. On the trade side while in absolute term trade increased during the Cameron 
period, the UK is still only responsible for 2% of the trade of China. It is even more 
striking that on the background of a relatively high likelihood of a BREXIT, which 																																																								
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China opposes, Chinese FDI is forecast to further increase given the deals signed at 
Xi’s London visit in October 2015.  
 
Between Hu’s and Xi’s leadership the win-sets for China have been relatively stable. 
Nevertheless, under the late Hu and the Xi administration new elements have 
influenced the sets like the domestic problems of especially, the slowing economy and 
the growing tensions with the US and Japan but also other Asian countries mostly 
about territorial claims. The fact that most of those countries have some form of 
backing by the US, stronger in case of Japan and Korea, makes the relationship with 
the even US more difficult as it already is given the tensions between the current 
hegemon and upcoming (regional) power.  Despite these tensions, however, the key 
economic win-set for China continues to be enabling trade globally to drive economic 
which has not changed between Hu and Xi. 
 
In the UK, however, the win-set of Brown was narrower than Cameron’s. Yet this is 
not reflected in the trade and investment data and bilateral agreements. Rather 
Cameron with a clear policy of appeasing China has been successfully attracting 
Chinese FDI and both sides plan to start a “golden area” 166.  
 
Therefore, in summary, Putnam’s two level analysis cannot fully explain the increase 
trade and investment of China in the UK under Xi and Cameron. While the win-set 
for China has become smaller under Xi, the change between Hu and Xi is only 
marginal given the continuing dependence of China on global trade and therefore it’s 
fostering of said trade and investment of Chinese corporations abroad. From the 																																																								
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Chinese side it, according to Putnam could have not influenced the dynamics of 
negotiations between China and the UK much. The win-set of the UK at the same 
time has changed significantly. The UK is dependent on external funding, to fund its 
infrastructure projects and create jobs while the aftermath of the GFC, especially new 
regulations, is still slowing growth in the financial sector. The population and several 
parties in the UK as well as trade unions are more favorable about the Brexit and 
stronger ties to China may enable the UK to negotiate either a better deal with the EU 
or perform a Brexit altogether. This looks different however looking at the British 
Industry which is largely in favor of remaining in the EU to keep the single market167. 
Yet again a bigger piece of the Chinese market may compensate at least partially for 
the lost trade with continental Europe. The increased win-set may, however, have 
caused the UK to become the first EU member of the AIIB despite its key ally US not 
favorably reacting on this move168. 
 
Nevertheless, most of the Chinese and British moves can also explained with power 
games by both China and the UK as seen in Waltzian Neorealism or through absolute 
gains fostered by Liberalism without using domestic levels of analysis.  
 
Using Liberalism, instead of using Putnam to explain the change in outcome over the 
last 10 years and during the different leaderships in both the UK and China it seems 
indeed that China and the UK are looking at absolute gains when increasing trade 
over many other considerations. Both countries are in a difficult economic 
environment and the trade and investment agreement signed during Xi’s visit in 2015 																																																								
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in the UK will help both countries. The UK will be able to fund expansion of its 
overstretched infrastructure and energy network and can open up the Chinese market 
to more domestic companies further helping economic growth, while hoping to attract 
Chinese investment in manufacturing and other industries to create jobs. China and Xi 
at the same time are able to entry into markets with SOE’s and decrease their 
dependence on few select markets. In addition, investment of Chinese foreign 
reserves away from US treasuries decreases the high exposure to US polices of the 
value of the Chinese reserves and give the potential for higher returns on investment. 
Lastly the willingness of the UK to be the first European member of the AIIB 
benefited Xi’s polices and institution building extremely as a significant number of 
European countries followed the UK’s signal and made the AIIB a truly international 
organization compared to the initial pan-Asian backing.  
 
Even Waltzian Neorealism, which assumes that the state of anarchy in international 
politics leads to states acting in ways that ensures their security as key determinant 
can explain the increased trade and investment between the two countries during the 
late Hu and Xi administration169. Beijing feels its security threatened by the US 
military presence in the APAC region and by the US’s domination of world trade and 
economic institution like the IMF. Therefore, increasing ties with the UK, historically 
one of US key allies and seen as a special relationship170, and winning British 
participation in Beijing counterpart to the IMF, the AIIB, can be seen as a move by 
the Xi administration to defend its security of trade which is key to keep the economy 
growing, calm domestic discontent and therefore keep a tight grip on the power in 																																																								
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China. The investment into key strategic sectors in the UK at the same time could 
ensure a strong dependence of the UK on China which may influence coalition 
building in future conflict. Generally weakening the US-EU/UK alliance could be 
seen as a defensive move by Beijing and a neorealist move on the way to a possible 
new power balance. For the UK closer ties are a hedge against possible negative 
implications of a Brexit and enables the UK to punch above its weight in global 
politics should the UK become the key trading and investment partner and possibly 
mediator between the US and China, as forecast by some analysts171. 
 
As shown above Putnam alone cannot alone explain the significant increase in 
especially Chinese investment into the UK. While the UK administrations had 
different win-sets, Brown with a smaller one was not able to attract Chinese 
investment which increased exponentially after Cameron took office. The win-set of 
the Hu and Xi administration are very similar with Xi having a slightly narrower set. 
While for example the entry of the UK into the AIIB could be explained by the larger 
UK win-set compared to the Chinese win-set, it remains unclear what caused the 
sudden increase in investment. Other theories as mentioned have their own 
explanations of the increased relationship between both countries under Cameron and 
Xi.  
 
Liberalism can most compellingly explain the trade as both countries are achieving 
absolute gains and show complementary interests in the relationships. While under 
Xi, Chinese SOE’s are increasingly looking outward for investment, the UK with a 
stretched budget desperately needed external investment.  While this situation in the 
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UK already existed under Brown, he had, as previously shown, more internal 
constituencies that were hindering closer Chinese ties such as his own labor party or 
the EU which may have led to a slower increase in Chinese trade and investment into 
the UK. 
 
Both leaders Xi and Cameron are pronouncing a new strong partnership between the 
two counties and based on the memorandum of understanding signed in October 
2015, it can be forecast that trade and investment between the two countries will 
continue its strong increase and outperform other partners such as the US or Europe. 
The aforementioned complementary needs for both countries play a role as well as 
further focus of the Chinese government to bolster its SOE and make them more 
competitive globally.  
 
Nevertheless, the Brexit vote in June and the continuing slow-down in China may 
negatively impact the increase. As the Chinese Administration made clear they are 
opposing a Brexit which could complicate European market access for Chinese SOEs 
based in the UK. A continued slowdown of the Chinese economy might have the Xi 
administration refocusing its attention on domestic problems, like Hu during the first 
years of his leadership, which could slow down the trade and investment with the UK.  
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Energy developments between China and the UK  
 
China’s President Xi Jinping visited the United Kingdom in October 2015. Beijing 
regarded it as a “Super State Visit” because of the high reception level. Both President 
Xi Jinping and Prime Minister David Cameron announced the Sino-UK relation had 
entered a “Golden Age." 
 
Based on the multi-levels cooperation between China and the United Kingdom, 
energy cooperation is a highlight. Not only in fossil fuel sectors, but also in clean 
energy and renewable energies. Among all the energy projects, Hinkley nuclear 
power plant is so significant because of its enormous expensive construction cost and 
it allowed the big amount of China’s investment.  
 
After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011, many countries slowed down 
nuclear energy development; some even stopped constructing new nuclear plants. The 
public was concerned about nuclear radiations and nuclear wastes. The Hinkley 
power station will be the first nuclear power station built in Britain after the 
Fukushima disaster. Supporters of Hinkley project highlighted the benefits it would 
bring: more employment opportunities, lower carbon emissions and increased UK’s 
energy security. However, opposite arguments are worried about the potential nuclear 
disaster will bring a grave danger to the British people.  
 
This section will apply Putnam’s two-level game theory and win-set theory when 
discussing the Sino-UK nuclear projects. Firstly, major players from China and the 
UK will have shared interests in proceeding to cooperate so that the decision of 
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signing project is a reflection of the meeting of demands for both sides. Secondly, 
China's needs may be different from the UK's demands, so there are international 
negotiations between both parties. Thirdly, because only the negotiation delegation 
can appear on the negotiation table, so the chief negotiators must guard the interest of 
domestic groups. 
 
Thus, the Hinkley project is a result of China-UK negotiation, and it shows some 
common interests from both players. This essay will examine if Putnam’s theory can 
be used to explain the Sino-UK interactions and what are the common interests. This 
paper will begin introducing information on the Hinkley nuclear plant C project and 
the connections to Putnam's theory. Following the introduction is a theoretic 
framework for understanding Putnam's two-level theory and the concept of win-sets. 
The third part will discuss China's win-sets in the program, followed by United 
Kingdom's win-sets analyses in the fourth part. The conclusion and future prediction 
will finish this section of the essay. 
 
Theoretical framework 
As Putnam is concerned, international negotiations are not only economically but also 
possible politically; not only a bargaining between delegations on behalf of countries 
but also reflecting domestic demands. The negotiation thus becomes a two-level 
game.172 Level I called the international level which chief negotiator bargaining for 
national interests. Level II called the domestic level which chief negotiator bargaining 
and defending internal groups’ interest. The game also includes the interactions 																																																								
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between I and level II. Both Level I and level II can affect each other. 
 
Win-sets is a core concept in the two-level game theory. Each player involved in the 
negotiation represent their interests and goals. Sometimes these interests are 
consistent but sometimes they are opposite.  Only an actual common interest or an 
overlap of interest can finally make an achievement. Thus the preferences, coalitions 
and negotiation strategy are supreme to achieve the win-sets.173 
 
Chief negotiator or leader is important in the negotiation because the person is the 
only formal link connecting level I and level II. The chief negotiator is expected to be 
well informed about links of interests and well experienced in negotiation 
strategies.174  
 
Energy industries in the UK and China 
Sino-UK energy cooperation is going deeply with the agreement of Chinese 
investments to Hinkley Nuclear Power Plant C; there are more projects are under 
discussion between China and the United Kingdom’s governments. The bilateral 
dialogues are multiple and normalizing with the establishments of UK-China Energy 
Dialogues and the UK-China Business Forum, as well as the on-going procedures. In 
recent years, both governments are emphasizing on fossil fuel diversification and 
developing clean energy to reduce Co2 emission, control energy pollution, and coping 
with global climate change. Both China and the UK are more focusing on innovations 
in clean energy and renewable energy, transition from traditional sectors as oil and 
gas, to new energies including nuclear power, solar power, and wind power.  																																																								
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Recent energy programs under Sino-UK cooperation 
Date Program The UK side China side 
Oct. 2015 Hinkley Nuclear Power Plant C175 
Electricite de 
France 
China General 
Nuclear Power 
Corporation 
Oct. 2015 20-year deal of 1 million tons of LNG 176 BP 
China Huadian 
Corporation 
Jun. 2015 
Contract of world’s first tidal 
energy plant in Swansea 
Bay177 
-- China Harbour Engineering 
Oct. 2015 
Framework agreement on 
strategic cooperation in 
potential shale gas exploration 
and production178 
BP 
China National 
Petroleum 
Corporation 
(CNPC) 
Dec. 2014 
Agreement on acquiring an 80 
percent stake in three 
Electricite de France SA wind 
farms in the U.K.179 
Electricite de 
France 
China General 
Nuclear Power 
Group 
Jun. 2014 20-year deal of 1.5 million tons of LNG180 BP 
China National 
Offshore Oil 
Corporation 
Apr. 2014 Solar power plants of 300 megawatts181 -- 
AVIC International 
Holding 
Corporation 
 
As the table shows, fossil fuel trades are still necessary to both side according to the 
two liquid gas deals between the UK and two Chinese State-owned firms. The totally 
2.5 million tonne of gas will continually supply China for the coming 20 years, which 
would increase Britain’s exporting and help to ease China’s high demands on LNG 																																																								
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consumption. The most significant part is the multiple cooperation on clean energy 
and renewable energy. The Hinkley Nuclear Power Plant C is the most expensive 
plant in the UK, and it is the first nuclear power station project after Fukushima 
nuclear disaster. The Swansea Bay tidal energy plant will be the first one in the world 
thus it attracts a lot of attention from the industry.  
 
Enormous Chinese investments are dropping into the UK market. The two agreements 
on LNG’s After Premier Li Keqiang and Xi Jinping visited the United Kingdom, it 
was apparently that China’s investments and trades to the UK had been increasing. 
Businesses came from the political supporting. Both the UK and China’s government 
had established a deeper understanding of political mechanism so that business 
interactions were strongly supported. For the UK, those energy project can firstly 
reflect that Britain has the possibility to develop multiple energy industries; secondly 
it can reflect Britain’s determination on energy power and welcome world’s capital to 
boom the energy industries; thirdly it shows that Britain need to diversify energy 
industry from traditional fossil fuel to generate electricity for civil use. For China, the 
historical “Opening-up Policy” encourages China’s companies to connect with the 
global market, thus many State-owned enterprises had entered overseas market for a 
long time. With the increasing policy support and financial support from Beijing, 
together with their self-designed technology, a mature market as Britain could help 
them grow into an international company. Also China need to balance the high 
demand of energy consumptions. Keeping fossil fuel importing is an essential element, 
while crapping the advantages on renewable and clean energy is more significant to 
China’s domestic energy dilemma. Edward Davey, the Secretary of State for Energy 
& Climate Change in the United Kingdom, said in the third UK-China Energy 
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Dialogue, “the best friendships are built on shared interests”.182 This truth can also 
apply on Sino-UK energy cooperation. The next part will show some foundations of 
these remarkable interactions. 
 
 The UK’s energy developments  
Being a major power in the world, the United Kingdom is also a vital role in the 
Europe. Britain has a very brilliant history in the modern world while she is in 
financial trouble in recent years. However, Britain remains sufficient technical 
strengths, sophisticated market mechanism, and rich experiences.  
 
Mature oil and gas industry 
The United Kingdom was rich in oil and gas so that it was a significant resource 
exporter in the past century. Most of the UK’s production were from offshore farms 
and Aberdeen was a major role in Britain’s energy history.183Oil production peaked at 
2000 with nearly 160 cube meters annually, while it went down to below 100 in the 
later years.184  
 
In the past century, the exportation of North Sea sharply increase the world oil and 
gas storages, and Britain had benefited by the rich farms. Oil and natural gas helped 
the UK established systematical energy industry. The BP Company entered the North 
Sea five decades ago and had invested 35 billion pounds into exploring, production, 
and delivery.185 The North Sea helped BP become the top class energy company in 
the world. However, North Sea’s storage is going small after year’s production; 																																																								
182 Edward Davey's opening speech to the UK-China Energy Dialogue. 
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Britain needs new and stable energy resource to satisfy current energy consumption. 
 
Concentrated on energy technologies 
Britain understood their shrinking storage in the North Sea, and they had developed 
alternative energies with advanced technologies. The government issued an energy 
the ETL (or Energy Technology Product List, ETPL) for energy efficient and energy 
business.186 The technologies include heat pumps, pipework insulation, solar systems 
and many electricity equipments.  
 
The UK developed nuclear into civilian use from last century. By operating more than 
20 nuclear power plants, Britain has experienced in the manufacture and daily 
management. Being one of the countries who manage nuclear weapons, the UK has a 
long history of nuclear arms testing and missiles testing.187  
 
Advanced in multi-energy developments 
As the Ministry of Energy mentioned that the UK is surrounded by the ocean, which 
it’s hard to import energy resource from other countries. The state has devoted into 
multiple energy industries, including biofuel, water power, wind power from the 
1970s.188  
 
In recent years, the UK has invested into renewable energy into civilian use. An 
appropriate proportion of Britain’s public electricity came from nuclear and other 
clean energy. 																																																								
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187 Goldberg, Alfred (July 1964). "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent". International 
Affairs 40 (3): 409–429.  
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Education on energy 
The UK has special courses on different kind of energies. Schools provide educations 
to primary and secondary levels students on energy efficiency.189 Universities also 
provide energy degree courses covering engineering, transferring, and effectiveness. 
Even the French energy giant EDF provide professional trainings on energy 
innovations.  
 
After the UK’s government allowed China’s State-owned companies to join the local 
nuclear projects, Britain opened up market to Chinese investments. It is showing that 
both sides had upgraded into a higher level’s governmental cooperation.  
  
China’s energy demands 
China is the second largest economy in the world and China is the biggest net energy 
importer in the world. China regards energy market seriously. Enormous market and 
abundant foreign exchange reserves strongly support China’s businesses. 
 
Industry upgrade  
China’s GDP growth has dropped from annual 10 percent to below 7 percent in recent 
days. When GDP growth is high, China’s economic performs well and domestic 
economic unbalance is not outstanding. China is famous for its exporting so that 
China is named as world factory. However, China also wants to shift from “Make of 
China” to “Design of China”. With the slowly economic growth, China’s exporting 
market is shrinking. On one hand, China’s low-end steel products is difficult to sell to 																																																								
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67		
overseas market while China has to import high-end steel products for manufacturing 
applications and luxury automobiles.  This is an example to show China’s 
overcapacity, and this is the reason Beijing emphasizes on industry upgrading.  
 
Beijing came up with many solutions to deal with overcapacity problem and devotes 
to upgrade industries. China’s president and premier are promoting railway products 
all over the world. Chinese companies had signed contracts with African countries to 
construct the Eastern African railways connecting Kenya, Rwanda and some other 
main roles in east Africa. With the first phase and the coming phases, China’s self-
designed railway standards and rail-related products entered the world market by 
dissolving domestic steel production. According to China’s new energy plan (2025) 
issued jointly by National Energy Administration, National Development and Reform 
Commission, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Beijing will 
focus on deeper and wider innovation of clean energy technology and efficiency of 
fossil fuel, and the cooperation of energy market.190 
 
With the upgrade of the energy industry, China will concentrate more on self-
designed technology on green coal, shale gas, and nuclear power. The Central 
government will provide policy and financial support for establishing the energy 
mechanism. Global nuclear energy had slowed down since the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, but it also exists an opportunity to restart this energy because of the global 
warming issues. For Beijing, it will be a chance to stimulate China’s economy and 
apply China’s technology into the world market. 
 
																																																								
190 Xinhua, 2016. http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-06/20/c_129077318.htm 
68		
 
Serious energy market 
China’s energy structure is unbalanced which highly depends on coal consumption. 
Coal are used for heating, to generate electricity, to support manufacture industry. 
More than 40 percent of China’s energy are coming from burning coal which resulted 
in high emission of carbon dioxide. But it is difficult for China to stop the coal 
industry since many people in China are fed by coal digging and coal is much cheaper 
to purchase than other natural resource. As a result, China has established a goal to 
reduce the usage of coal and increase the usage of other natural resource before the 
middle of 21 century. It was significant that China’s co2 emission had dropped 2 
percent from 2015 to 2016, which showing China’s decision of energy diversification.  
 
Oil and gas rank after coal to be China’s another valuable energy resource. With the 
development of civilization, there is a sharp increase of China’s citizens which 
requires abundant supply of gas; and automobile demands are still high in domestic 
China which requires rich petroleum. The huge gap between China’s energy 
production and consumption troubles Beijing. China has surpassed the United States 
and been the biggest energy importer in the world. China’s natural resources 
importing are mainly from the Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabic, and Africa 
countries such as Angola. With the One Belt One Road framework, China also has 
more channels to import natural gas from Central Asian countries as Kazakhstan and 
Turkistan. The conventional routes are from the land and from the sea. The former 
route makes China actively construct pipeline between Xinjiang province and 
Kazakhstan so that rich gas resources can flow to domestic China in a more secure 
way; the latter one also faces many uncontrollable elements such as extreme weather 
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and pirates, as well as potential problems when crossing Malacca Strait. Shale gas 
would be a pivotal role in China’s future energy market. The United State has the 
high-end technology on collecting shale gas from the gas farm while it is apparently 
expensive. China’s Sichuan province owns abundant shale gas and the storage rank 
the first in the world, much higher than the US’s. Under the future cooperation 
between BP and Chinese firm, China might also improve self-design methods to draw 
these natural resource into civil use.  
 
Government of china shares the responsibility to reduce carbon dioxide emission to 
cope with global climate change, hence Beijing has to shift from fossil fuel to clean 
energy and renewable energy gradually.  Wind power, solar power, and other energy 
are all alternative resource but they more or less depend on uncontrollable elements. 
They will determined by the wind, the sun, or the rivers. Considering the limits, 
Chinese government would like to regard nuclear energy as priority. There are many 
nuclear power plants built or in discussion along China’s coastal areas before Japan’s 
nuclear disaster. After the globally slowing down on nuclear construction, China has 
restarted the agenda to nuclear energy. Not only more plants will be built in coastal 
areas, but also in inter land cities. China’s advantage is local nuclear companies has 
innovated self-designed nuclear reactor; China’s disadvantage is lacking of nuclear 
management experiences. 
 
To sum up, China need breakouts in energy sector especially in oil, gas, and nuclear. 
Moreover, China can learn the mature experiences and managements from the United 
Kingdom.  
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Case study on Hinkley Nuclear power plant 
 
1. Overviews on UK’s Nuclear Market 
 
Nearly three-quarter of UK’s energy consumption is from fossil fuels, following by 
16% from coal and 15% from nuclear and other renewable energy. (See Figure 1) 
However, with natural gas and oil production decline, UK has become a net energy 
importer in need of diversifying energy supply. The UK’s electricity market demands 
more resources too. Gas and coal are the major resources used to generating 
electricity, but nuclear usage remains low. (See Figure 2). Driving by demands on 
energy diversification and electricity supply, renewable energy is a good choice for 
the British market. 
 
 
(Source: EIA191) 
 
																																																								
191 EIA. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/United_Kingdom/uk.pdf 
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(Source: EIA192) 
 
Nuclear power research started in the United Kingdom from the 1940s and 
government turned it into civil use after the World War II193. With the world’s leading 
technology of the first generation of reactor named Magnox reactors, British gave 
birth to several nuclear plants for public use. There are fifteen nuclear reactors in use 
nowadays, but most of them will be shut down by the 2030s.194 To meet the 
increasing electricity consumption, along with de-carbonization procedure, UK 
decides to build new nuclear power plants. 
 
The Hinkley Point C, the one signed between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister 
David Cameron, is located in Somerset, north-west of England. It will be the first 
nuclear facility built in the United Kingdom after the Fukushima disaster. Whereas 
some member states in the European Union either have slowed down nuclear energy 
																																																								
192 Ibid. 
193 World Nuclear Association. http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-
profiles/countries-t-z/appendices/nuclear-development-in-the-united-kingdom.aspx 
194 EIA. 
https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/United_Kingdom/uk.pdf 
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development or have shut down nuclear power stations195, UK decided to continue 
plan another 13 new nuclear plants to meet the electricity demand.196 Based on the 
cooperation on Hinkley Point C project, CGN further eyes on Bradwell nuclear power 
station in Essex with the intention to integrate China-designed Hualong reactor.197 
Different with the minority share CGN has in Hinkley project, the Chinese State-
owned company intends to hold more than half of stake in the Bradwell project and 
principally hold 20 percent stake in the Sizewell power plant project in Suffolk.198 
 
 
(Source: world-nuclear199) 
 
2. China’s Win-sets in the Game 
 																																																								
195 Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-nuclear-idUSKCN0SQ1G520151101 
196 World Nuclear Association, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-
profiles/countries-t-z/united-kingdom.aspx 
197 Ibid. 
198 Xinhua. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/22/c_134740998.htm 
199 World-nuclear. Org. http://www.world-nuclear.org/getmedia/3db6c72a-aa1d-40bb-9611-
ac628bf7d1f9/nuclear-power-plants-in-united-kingdom.png.aspx 
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China is now an emerging power increasing her economic and political influences in 
the world, but China chose to follow the Westphalia system as a member. Respecting 
United States’ hegemony in the current international order, China does not pose 
threats to the United States neither economically nor politically.200 However, a 
strategic partner relationship with the United Kingdom can fulfill China’s internal 
demand and external demand. Chinese investors regard London as a more preferred 
destination because the market is English speaking, sophisticated capital system, high 
profitability, and labors are higher-educated.201  
 
The next section of this paper will include discussion major players including CGN, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce and the National Development 
and Reform Commission in China’s win-sets in the nuclear industry. 
 
2.1 CGN’s Interests 
 
CGN is a leading state-owned company based in Shenzhen, Guangdong province. 
China’s State Council supervises as well as the general nuclear energy developments. 
 
CGN's businesses cover nuclear power, wind power, hydropower, and solar power. It 
also specializes in the design of nuclear power plants, construction and operation. 
CGN has six nuclear power plants in operation and three under construction along the 
coast in southeastern China. CGN’s Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station is the earliest 
nuclear power plant used commercially in China since 1994. The company also 
concentrate on nuclear technology innovation. CGN now has intellectual property 																																																								
200 Babones, Salvatore. "China's Predictable Slowdown." Foreign Affairs 18 (2015). 
201 Corre, Philippe Le. "China's Offensive in London." Foreign Affairs. N.p., 8 Apr. 2016. Web. 8 Apr. 
2016. 
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rights on the third-generation nuclear reactor named “Hualong”.202  
 
Benefited by the political background and “Going out policy”, CGN had started 
businesses outside China many years ago. CGN has several sub-companies in UK, 
Turkey, Kazakhstan, US and South Africa operating uranium trades, nuclear 
improvements, and clean energy cooperation.203 The European market is CGN’s 
priority task. Further cooperation on nuclear and other renewable power with the 
United Kingdom can help CGN become more internationally recognized.204  
 
CGN’s overseas expansions face pressure from China National Nuclear Corporation 
(CNNC), the monopoly in China’s nuclear industry. Two entities have similar 
products and services while CNNC has better performance in the global market 
running a business in more than forty countries. In domestic China, CGN’s nuclear 
power stations are mainly located along the coast while CNNC’s stations are in 
interior areas. The competition between CGN and CNNC will exist in long-term. 
Though CGN’s nuclear power station construction businesses are developing faster 
than CNNC, the latter is still dominant.205 Those transnational contracts will help 
CGN establish a globalized identity and CGN can learn nuclear power management 
experience from EDF, which can apply to China’s market. 
 
2.2 The role of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Understanding how China perceives current international order it is important to 																																																								
202 CGN. http://en.cgnp.com.cn/n658579/n658706/n678477/c831165/content.html 
203 CGN. http://www.cgnpc.com.cn/n471051/n471186/n811384/index.html 
204 "中广核欧洲能源公司收购英国风电项目." 国际工程与劳务 1(2015):91-91. 
205 Xinhua, “中广核“曲线救国”欲破中核垄断”http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-
12/16/c_127306895.htm 
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discuss China’s foreign policy. That includes: 1) the current international order is 
based on the Western value, but it is not a universal one. 2) China is subjected to US's 
leadership status quo, and China will follow the US-led order as a participator. 3) 
China will be a more active player economically, politically and deepen involvement 
in the security fields globally.206 China is active in the international and regional 
stages in 2015 : G20 Summit, APEC Meeting, UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, as well as the forums of Sino-Africa, Sino-EU, and Sino-Latin 
America.207 
 
Since Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang took office in 2013, Chinese carried out an anti-
corruption campaign and a conceived the notion of “China Dream.” Being a revised 
version of the traditional “Going Out Policy”, the Silk Road Economic Belt is a 
revised text of the traditional “Going Out Policy” which became the priority of 
China’s foreign policy. It focuses on a further cooperation with Asian, African and 
European countries. There will be an integrated infrastructure network under the 
framework including high-speed railways, oil pipelines, and nuclear power plants. 
These increasing economic ties in the Eurasian market with the establishment of 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will both bring China the opportunity to 
become the regional leader or even a China-led world order.208 
 (Figure 3: The routes of Silk Road Economic Belt) 
																																																								
206 Fu Ying. "Debating the Contemporary International Order." 
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2015-f463/july-636f/fullerton-lecture-fu-ying-d620  
207 Report on the Work of the Government. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-
03/17/c_135198880_2.htm 
208 Fasslabend, Werner. "The Silk Road: a political marketing concept for world dominance." European 
View 14.2 (2015): 293-302. 
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Europe is an important polar in the world, and there will be a more active and stable 
Sino-European partnership in the future.209 With strong historical background, United 
Kingdom maintains her dominant role in Europe. London consolidated as the 
financial center, political center and culture center in Europe. London has been the 
first European country joined AIIB, which showed Britain’s interest to China. 
Bilateral official visits in the past two years had shown a warming relation between 
Beijing and London. President Xi's super state visit to London demonstrated a deeper 
and wider strategic partnership between two countries.   
 
2.3 The Role of China’s Ministry of Commerce  
 
China’s annual Gross Domestic Production (GDP) growth dropped to 6.9 percent in 
																																																								
209Chinese foreign minister meets the press. "Positive momentum in China-Europe ties not expedient." 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/08/c_135167109.htm 
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2015, and the percent will go down in the coming years.210 China’s State Council and 
Ministry of Commerce have set a series of policies and goals to maintain China’s 
internal and external economy. According to Government Report 2016, the 
government will keep economic development as the central task and “Opening-Up 
Policy” will remain its central role. China will loosen foreign investment restriction 
and welcome more foreign direct investment in Pilot free trade zones in Guangdong 
Province and Shanghai City. Exporting of high-speed rail and nuclear products are 
highlights showing the government’s pledge of developing the Silk Road Economic 
Belt and AIIB.211 
China's foreign trade on total import and export dropped 20 percent and China's 
export to the EU is less-performed with 15.7 percent decrease.212 China’s industry 
overcapacity of steel and cement and the decision on industrial reform push 
government encouraging exporting infrastructure products to abroad and encouraging 
e-commerce in domestic to keep employment. China’s gained rich experience in 
building infrastructure construction projects domestically. Many Chinese SOEs have 
been responsible for various infrastructure projects for African countries, but each 
SOE treats these contracts at risk because of the unstable political environment in 
African countries. The European market is more attractive to Chinese firms. The 
MOFCOM can enlarge and enhance economic ties to foreign markets through SOEs 
expansion overseas. 
 
China intends to shape its identity from "Made in China" to "Designed in China.” 
Even though there are still many cheap and low-quality goods manufactured in China 																																																								
210 World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/country/china 
211 Report on the Work of the Government. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-
03/17/c_135198880_2.htm 
212 The Regular Press Conference on the Ministry of Commerce (March 17, 2016). 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201603/20160301278807.shtml 
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and sold all around the world, considering the increasing labor cost, higher public 
concern on pollution and the overcapacity of major industries make China's 
manufacturers have to shift from the labor-intensive to tech-intensive development. 
"Railway Diplomacy" and "Nuclear Diplomacy" has been China's new business cards. 
With innovations on high-speed railways and the third-generation nuclear reactor, 
China needs a new hi-end tag on its exports. However, shifts like this are not easy. 
China suffered setbacks in several railroad deals with Mexico and Thailand. Whether 
or not railway diplomacy can achieve China’s goal, it can only be judged in the future 
with the rail projects under construction in Africa and the projects on negotiation with 
some EU member states. After Fukushima disaster, Russia signed many international 
nuclear contacts, and South Korea and Japan made breakthroughs in the United Arab 
and Saudi Arabia. A statement addressed by China’s National Energy Administration 
saying that China needs to be more active in the global nuclear energy market.213 
Thus, facing plenty critiques about national security and environmental damage from 
the domestic UK to Hinkley Plant C project, Chinese firms are unlikely to leave 
British market but raise investments on Bradwell power plant and Sizewell power 
plant.  
 
2.4 The Role of China’s National Development and Reform Commission 
 
China published the Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) in 2014. 
The Commission is responsible for monitoring and administrating China’s energy 
security. China surpassed the United States became the world’s largest net oil 
																																																								
213 People.com. “核电中国”让世人刮目看.  
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2014-05/03/content_1422723.htm 
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importer in 2013.214 With the increasing demand for electricity, China plans to reduce 
coal consumption and reduce carbon emission by employing more nuclear, wind, 
solar and gas energy for civilian use. 
 
China’s increasing external dependency on oil and gas poses energy security concern. 
China's import its oil and gas mainly from the Middle East and countries in Africa. 
Both areas are prone to security threats of wars and conflicts. Piracy issue also poses 
the same threat to China’s maritime shipping lane in the Malacca Strait; additional 
frictions with its neighboring country over South China Sea territorial dispute creates 
added uncertainty.215 Developing nuclear energy has been a focal point of solving 
energy security issue for a long time, and dozens of nuclear power plants have been in 
operation or under construction. However, Fukushima Disaster slowed down China's 
expansion in the nuclear energy sector. With 2014-2020 Energy Development 
Strategy Action Plan, China restarted the importance of nuclear energy development 
but remained highly concerned about energy security with preconditions on “adopting 
the world’s highest safety standard and ensuring safety”.216  
 
2.5 The Interests in China’s Side 
 
It is easier to discuss China’s win-sets in the Sino-UK nuclear cooperation because 
ratification of policy choice has traditionally encountered minimal friction within the 
executive branch of the government. Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) policy 
agenda is highly in line with government and industry’s agenda regarding expansion 																																																								
214 EIA. https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=CHN 
215 Downs, Erica. "China, The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Energy Security Series." The 
Brookings Institution 12 (2006). 
216 Energy Development Strategy Action Plan (2014-2020) (Chinese version only).  
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2014-11/19/content_9222.htm 
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to overseas markets. Thus, the win-sets analysis is on the overlaps of major players' 
interests.  
 
Firstly, there are interactions between CGN and China. CGN is a company that needs 
to seek more profits internationally while CGN is a State-Owned-Enterprise which 
requires it to follow CCP's decisions and policies. Secondly, there are interactions 
between SOEs and China's ministries. Often, China's ministries can influence strongly 
as well as rely on SOEs to interact with the world in accordance with its foreign 
policy. China's Ministries targeted various goals, the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
emphasizes on bilateral or multilateral relations. The Ministry of Commerce focuses 
on economic developments. The National Development and Reforms Commission 
devote to ensure China's energy security.    
 
Hinkley nuclear power plant project is a benefit to China’s economy, foreign relations, 
and energy security. Thus, the Hinkley plant C project represents China’s interests 
and is supported by China.  
 
3. UK’s Win-sets in the Game 
 
Several major players are in the analysis of UK’s win-sets, including the Conservative 
party, the Labour Party, and some key cabinet departments.  
 
The general election of Britain in 2015 had surprised the public. The Conservative 
Party triumphed in the battle against Labour Party capturing 331 seats in the House of 
Commons while the Labor party had a “dramatic losses” losing support from 
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Scotland.217 David Cameron remains as Britain’s Prime Minister and won majority 
public’s supports than five years ago. But the new government still need to deal with 
many problems.218 One of the priorities for the administration is on cutting Britain's 
budget deficit, the 2015 general election clearly demonstrates this point, the Labour 
Party made promises on cutting deficit every year while the Conservative Party 
pledged to reduce Government spending.219 Other national demands are on the agenda 
too, for instance, the continued surge of Scottish independence movement and the 
referendum on Britain’s membership in the European Union.  
 
China’s increasingly leading roles in international affairs are becoming more 
recognized than before. However, some countries are still taking a skeptical position 
regarding China’s economic development and political stability. For Britain, securing 
a cooperative bilateral relationship ahead of other competitive players has many 
advantages. As China further develops itself on all fronts, Britain’s interest would be 
able to extend and perpetuate into areas where lagged players could not. 
 
It is in Britain’s interest to develop a good partnership with China in Europe.220 The 
development of such partnership started with economic and financial joint agreements, 
followed by more cooperation in sensitive industries, such as CGN’s investment in 
Hinkley Nuclear Power Plant C and Huawei’s contract on UK’s national 
telecommunications network. Britain widely opened up the market to China despite 
																																																								
217 The Economist, 2015. “Britain’s Election Surprise”.  
218 The Economist, 2015. “Britain’s election: Cam again.” 
219 Parliament, UK. "The budget deficit: Key issues for the 2015 Parliament.” 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/economy-
public-finances/budget-deficit/ 
220 The Economist, 2015. "An interview with George Osborne."  
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opposition questioned China’s potential threats UK’s national security.221 
 
3.1 The Roles of Conservative Party and Labour Party 
 
The opposition Labour Party critiqued on the higher electricity bill due to the Hinkley 
plant C. According to the project deal, EDF will be paid 92.5 pounds per megawatt-
hour for thirty-five years on Hinkley plant C. Labour questioned that the government 
subsidy will eventually transfer to UK consumers, meaning that consumers will have 
to pay a price double than the current price for future electricity. But the chief of EDF 
defended the price mechanism since clean energy is more expensive than fossil 
energy. Electricity generated by Hinkley will be less costly than an aforementioned 
gas-powered station which will begin operation in 2024.222  
 
Both Conservative Party and the Labour Party have plans to follow Britain’s 
decarbonization procedure and agree on clean energy development, but the priority is 
different. Labours is more interested in wind power and less interested in nuclear 
power while Conservatives favors nuclear development. 223  Therefore, Labour 
questioned whether Britain should solely rely on nuclear energy development as 
alternatives to oil and gas. Those high subsidies devoted to Hinkley Plant C plant will 
reduce official supports for subsidies to other renewable energy developments.224 																																																								
221 FT.com. “UK security committee ‘shocked’ over Huawei contract with BT”. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/24bbea6e-ce87-11e2-ae25-00144feab7de.html#axzz45V9xQ7sQ 
222 Telegraph.uk. EDF: “Low power price 'irrelevant' to Hinkley Point nuclear deal”. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/11867331/EDF-Power-price-irrelevant-to-
Hinkley-Point-nuclear-deal.html 
223 Karl Mathiesen. “Would a Labour or Tory government be better for the environment?” 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/mar/03/labour-tory-government-be-better-for-
environment 
224 Bloomberg.com. “Look Beyond Hinkley for Britain's Nuclear Future, Labour Says”. 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-11/the-invisible-money-makers-who-thrived-
during-2015-s-oil-slump 
83		
There was a debate in the UK parliament in 2013 on the costs of clean energy 
development. The cost of improving nuclear power is around 200 pounds per MWh 
while offshore wind power costs 140 pounds per MWh and onshore wind power costs 
90 pounds per MWh.225 But Conservatives think wind power and solar power are 
highly dependent on the nature which is less predictable and out of human control. 
Thus, Conservatives maintains nuclear energy in the central aim of developing clean 
energy to meet increasing energy consumption.226   
 
Although Labour questioned the building of Hinkley Point C plant, they still support 
it for the following reasons. 1) The project can offer 25,000 more employment 
opportunities to the public according to EDF's report, a result that both Conservatives 
and Labour promised to increase employment and work opportunities in each of their 
election manifestoes. 2) Both Conservatives and Labour have to reduce greenhouse 
gas emission to combat climate change so investing in renewable and green energy is 
a must in Britain. 3) Britain's electricity generating resources mainly rely on oil and 
gas while the production from the North Sea is decreasing. Britain needs more energy 
to cover the consumption and production gap, be they nuclear, solar or the wind. Thus, 
the Hinkley project satisfied Britain’s demand.  
 
3.2 The Roles of UK’s major government departments 
 
Department of Energy & Climate Change 
This department is responsible for Britain’s energy development and energy security. 																																																								
225 David Thorpe. “Labour needs a new policy on Hinkley C and nuclear power”. 
http://www.theecologist.org/blogs_and_comments/commentators/2987427/labour_needs_a_new_polic
y_on_hinkley_c_and_nuclear_power.html 
226 The Guardian.com. "George Osborne puts the UK at the heart of the global race for mini-nuclear 
reactors."  
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It is not easy for Britain to import electricity from abroad. 227 Therefore self-sufficient 
is vital to Britain’s energy security. The French-Chinese Hinkley project will generate 
7% of electricity and service six million consumers at its designed capacity. With the 
operation of Hinkley and following projects of Sizewell and Bradwell, Department of 
Energy believes Britain can have a more controllable and low-carbon emission energy 
sources unlike wind power and solar power that are highly dependent weather.228 
 
Her Majesty’s Treasury 
The department is working on a national long-term economic plan. After the global 
financial crisis in 2008, Britain's economy is weakened and focused on deficit 
reduction and debt reduction which restricted investment flow into the energy 
industry. As chancellor George Osborne said, Chinese investment can benefit Britain 
and British people. China will share the responsibility to build the costly nuclear 
power plant in Britain so that government can increase much more budget and use 
taxpayer's money to health care and education.229 
 
3.3 Britain’s Interests in the Game 
 
From 2010 to 2015, the Conservative-led government set out economic recovery as 
the administration’s priority and the UK’s economy recovered from recession during 
the five-year coalition government that led by the Conservative government.230 The 
result of the election showed public support for the Conservative party and the party’s 
manifestos. 																																																								
227 GOV.uk. "Amber Rudd's speech on the energy benefits of staying in the EU."  
228 Gov.uk. "What the Government is doing to secure investment in clean, secure and affordable 
energy."   
229 The Economist. "Britain's foreign policy, An interview with George Osborne."   
230 Manifesto of Conservative Party. https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto 
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Foreign investments help Britain especially when the state emergently needs 
economic recovery. Although Conservatives and Labour have different concerns 
about Hinkley nuclear plant; and various governmental departments have a 
departmental focus on the issue. However, the overall Britain’s position backs the 
Hinkley project for benefits of economic development, energy self-sufficient and 
employment opportunity. 
 
4. Apply Putnam’s Theory into Hinkley Case 
 
Apply win-sets theory on the Hinkley’s case, focuses on areas where individual, 
groups and national interests overlaps. Apply two-level game theory, in this case, is 
evident to see how domestic demands influence state's international needs.    
Table 1: The List of Individual and National Interests 
 China Britain  
Domestic  
needs 
Economic development Economic development 
Increasing firms’ profit Reducing deficit 
Mitigate industrial overcapacity 
while profiting overseas 
Cutting government budget 
Learning advanced management 
experiences on nuclear power 
station 
Creating more jobs 
Ensuring energy self-sufficiency Ensuring energy self-sufficiency 
Ensuring energy security Ensuring energy security 
Decarbonization Decarbonization 
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International 
needs 
Acquiring cooperative 
relationship with the UK 
Acquiring cooperative 
relationship with China 
Promoting China's advanced 
infrastructure capacity and 
manufacturing technologies 
Attracting foreign investment  
As illustrate in Table 1, there are many overlapped interests between China and 
Britain. Both countries regard economic development as their central focus. Since 
Hinkley project is in the nuclear industry, both China and the UK have energy 
standard requirements. Those common interests become the win-sets of Hinkley 
project. 
 
The leader's' consolidation of power are important too. Xi is perceived to be the 
strongest leader since Mao Zedong. Therefore, the government and party under such 
influence would expect to have better policy outcomes and more efficient 
implementations. David Cameron and his team of ministers recovered the UK's 
economic conditions and also consolidated more power since the last general election. 
Applying chief negotiator's role in Putnam's theory, both leaders represented 
respective domestic interests and national interests well, and this enabled a win-win 
foundation during the negotiation process.   
 
5. The Limits of This Paper 
 
This paper has several limits when applying Putnam's theory into its analysis. Firstly, 
it is not easy to collect data on project negotiation procedures and terms of exchange 
between China and the UK. Secondly, the role of EDF was excluded in this discuss 
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because this paper focuses on Sino-UK relations. Thirdly, how the Hinkley project 
could affect domestic groups and how this project could affect Sino-UK relation in 
the future remain uncertain because the nuclear plant is under plan and construction. 
Therefore, many perceived negative components of the deal like the potential increase 
in electricity bill to consumers would not be seen until the completion of the project. 
 
With these limits, this paper can describe certain interactions between China and the 
UK, as well as interactions among individual players. At this stage, Putnam’s theory 
can only explain some part of the case, but cannot draw a comprehensive conclusion 
on the matter. 
 
China and Britain are both major powers at the global stage. A “Golden Age” coated 
bilateral relationship will make China and UK to expand cooperation into areas like 
finance, development, cultural exchange, social communication and other general 
areas. Based on the good start of nuclear cooperation on Hinkley power plant C, this 
would likely to lead the way of a wave of Chinese investment into Britain. However, 
while China and UK are enjoying their “Golden Era” in bilateral relations, it is worth 
asking how long beneficial conditions underlying the win-sets theory will last. 
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Climate Change  
 
Possibly more than any other country China is under both domestic and international 
pressure to mitigate climate change adequately. Reasons for this are vast in numbers 
and complexly linked at times. To some extent we consider Putnam´s two-level game 
theory as a guiding analytical framework again, aiming to more easily explain an 
increasingly benevolent tone between China and the U.K when exchanging thoughts 
on global warming countermeasures. Like other developed nations, the U.K. has often 
been an outspoken critic of China´s high amounts of carbon dioxide emissions but 
there seems to be a significant shift in attitudes. As a result, debates on global climate 
change become a powerful example to illustrate altering dynamics in win-sets within 
both China and the U.K. Crucial components that make up national political 
structures such as leadership style, the form of governmental system as well as 
opinions of civic society have always shaped international meetings to certain extents, 
including climate change conferences. 231  Pillars of domestic politics are being 
influenced or even simultaneously interact with international politics. Putnam´s 
theory also inspires to see how opinions from the wider international community 
affect win-set designing processes within China and the U.K. individually.  
 
This section of the capstone project refers to two of the most telling international 
meetings addressing global warming, the 2009 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Copenhagen and the recent 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Paris. Understanding of distinct case studies adds more profoundness 
when examining the changing nature of Chinese-British expectations of each other. 																																																								
231 Peter Christoff, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
International Organization 51 (1997): 513. 
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Compared to relations under the Gordon Brown and Hu Jintao era, specific domestic 
circumstances like the financial crisis of 2007/08 and its still existing aftereffect on 
the U.K, as well as rising security tensions for China with the U.S interest in the 
South China Sea, have led to significant growth in cooperation between David 
Cameron and Xi Jinping. Particular illumination of single negotiation actors allows 
enhanced comprehension about interplays between national and international political 
circumstances. Examination of country-specific domestic political circumstances 
under the Hu Jintao and Gordon Brown era as well as the current David Cameron and 
Xi Jinping period can shed light on respective behaviors towards each other during 
meetings on global warming. 
 
Overview of Meetings in Copenhagen and Paris  
In the eyes of developed countries, the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen was perceived as notorious failure. Western ambitions to establish 
binding carbon dioxide reduction commitments were not fulfilled whereas major 
Kyoto Protocol principles from 1992 like the “common but differentiated 
responsibility” conception were kept.232 A non-binding Copenhagen Accord was 
drafted by America and the four big newly industrialized BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China), agreed upon by more than 100 U.N. member states.233 
Highlights of this arrangement included the limitation of a global temperature rise to 
an increase of 2 degree Celsius - above pre-industrial levels -, call for more 
transparency of climate change actions by developing countries, as well as increased 
allocation of financial resources and capacity building to help less developed 																																																								
232 Peter Christoff, “Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at Copenhagen,” 
Environmental Politics 19 (2010): 637. 
233 Karl Hallding, Marie Jürisoo, Marcus Carson and Aaron Atteridge,“Rising Powers: The Evolving 
Role of BASIC countries,” Climate Policy 13 (2013): 608. 
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nations.234  
 
Results of the Copenhagen conference left former British Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown and his Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed Miliband, 
deeply disappointed with China in particular. Back then, Britain´s domestic socio-
economic conditions were more favorable compared to now, allowing it to express 
open critique about China on an international platform. Like other developed nations, 
they too hoped China would support the idea of binding promises to make up for its 
high levels of carbon dioxide emissions. However, as announced by the influential 
National Development & Reform Commission of China (NDRC) and China´s 
Department of Climate Change, China made official plans for “autonomous domestic 
mitigation actions” after dispute with developed countries in Copenhagen.235 As 
following developments have shown, China did not shy away from actual 
implementation of important measures such as promotion of the renewable energy 
industry. Rather than lack of commitment, it was more a question if China was 
already prepared to take responsibility on the world stage in 2009. Part of the answer 
lies in China´s limited win-set situation at the time. The Hu administration prioritized 
domestic affairs and efforts to ensure internal stability through rising economic output 
over promising actions to the wider international community. Further explanation for 
this logic is shown in later parts of this particular capstone section about climate 
change negotiations.  
 
On the contrary, the atmosphere at the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris last 																																																								
234 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, “Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference,” 
Review of Policy Research 27 (2010): 795. 
235 Yingying Lu, Alison Stegman and Yiyong Cai, “Emissions Intensity Targeting: From China´s 12th 
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year was perceived to be much more pleasant. For the first time in history there was 
some form of universally adopted, binding climate change deal. Though some of the 
agreements like the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) are not 
binding yet, they allowed increased confidence in the process to fight global warming. 
China´s INDCs included Enhanced Actions on Climate Change, highlighting newly 
found responsibility to “fully engage in global governance” by further committing to 
a peak in carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and an ever increasing share of non-
fossil fuels.236 China´s goals did not sound too different from previous non-binding 
roadmaps in terms of ambition but since the country truly achieved successful pursuit 
of its former agendas, reactions in Paris by developed nations were comparatively 
positive.  
 
As usual Western critics like the U.K. became weaker themselves since the 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit (partly because of specific weaknesses in 
domestic decision making mechanisms), there seemed to be more agreement with 
China´s developments in 2015. Aware of China´s growing desire to become a 
superpower and worried about its own national budget deficits, Britain´s leaders knew 
their future win-sets would most likely be influenced by China´s financial injections 
into their energy sector in the near future. As part of the E.U., the U.K.´s INDC 
ambitions were set for overall emission reductions of 40% by 2030.237 Considering 
voting on the U.K.´s future relation with the E.U. (i.e. Brexit) was soon to be followed, 
it is surprising that David Cameron´s administration especially pushed for quite 
ambitions targets. At present it is highly debatable whether the U.K. can commit to 																																																								
236 Anthony HF Li, “Hopes of Limiting Global Warming? China and the Paris Agreement on Climate 
Change,” China Perspectives 1 (2016): 49. 
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promised cuts in carbon dioxide emissions to this great degree without continuous 
financial support from the E.U. when Brexit is about to happen. With the latest results, 
the win-set conditions of the U.K seem to have changed dramatically, increasing 
hopes towards better cooperation with China all the more. There will be increasing 
need to change the U.K.´s national agenda to make it complementary to China´s 
foreign policy goals. Determination of the national win-set is not that much of a 
sovereign matter anymore. In addition, in times when China´s relationship with the 
U.S. becomes increasingly volatile, both the U.K. as well as China can benefit from 
each other’s assistance. 
 
Conditions of Negotiation Partners and Implications for Climate Change Debates 
As previously mentioned, multiple key deciding factors from domestic political life 
such as leadership style, form of governmental system and public opinions play into a 
country´s behavior in international negotiations. Regarding energy politics, China´s 
maneuvering room is mostly influenced by the overall agenda of the nation´s most 
influential political factor, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Regarding other 
governmental institutions, there are interests by actors from the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Science and Technology, as well as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Having mentioned this, due to its closeness to the CCP 
elite the National Development and Reform Commission, and even more so, the 
informal advising committee around the National Leading Group to Address Climate 
Change and Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction (NLGACCECER) have 
considerable more power over climate change policies compared to ministries 
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listed.238 As the NLGACCECER is headed by the Chinese Premier, there is direct 
linkage to the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist 
Party of China (the country´s committee consisting of the prime leadership from the 
CCP).  
 
Compared to 2009, present Chinese business communities which share access to the 
energy sector with major state-owned enterprises as well as general public opinion is 
much more weighted into overall decision making processes of the leadership circle. 
Developments regarding energy have become a key tool to manage foreign policies 
whilst still existing high pollution levels pose an increasing risk of domestic social 
unrest. Overall, the Chinese President and the rest of the CCP elite have the biggest 
influence on China´s stance on international climate change debates, both in 2009 and 
2015. Compared to Hu Jintao´s contributions to climate change politics however, Xi 
Jinping proves to be much more hands on as he tries to centralize power. Xi´s 
appearance at the 2015 Climate Change in Paris simultaneously personified China´s 
commitment to energy transformation and aspiration to become an even stronger 
global power player.  
 
In the U.K., interests in energy politics are represented by the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change as well as the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs.239 (On an interesting side note: After the vote to leave the E.U., newly 
appointed British Prime Minister Theresa May created the Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy - merging the Department of Energy and Climate 																																																								
238 Wei Liu and Bo Qin, “Low-Carbon City Initiatives in China: A Review From the Policy Paradigm 
Perspective,” Cities 51 (2016): 131. 
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Change together with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.240 The 
move signals Britain´s increasing awareness that business and energy politics are not 
to be separated, elevating China´s role as a closer ally to the U.K. with its financial 
resources and strategic investment strategies for the developed world).  
 
There are significant differences between commitments to fight global warming, 
including degrees of legal implications, amongst Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. Whilst Hu 
focused primarily on country specific internal affairs and therefore made less room 
for issues related to the rest of the world, Xi Jinping understands how to utilize 
China´s cutting-edge in renewables and financial reserves targeting energy related 
investment projects to gain a more assertive role in international politics. China´s 
changing win-sets have seen increased attention on global warming and how energy 
market structures have powerful economic and geo-strategic implications.  
 
For Britain on the other hand, both 2009 and last year´s conference marked the 
country´s continuous official dedication to counteract global warming. Having said 
this, interest in the topic was driven by varying objectives. Though there is always the 
genuine hope to help protect the earth, the U.K.´s current interference with worldwide 
energy arrangements is increasingly related to concerns about the domestic economy. 
China is seen as one of the last hopes to contribute to Britain´s economic and energy 
security. David Cameron and his government became flexible enough to allow market 
access for China despite widespread security concerns, adjusting the national win-set 
configuration according to compatibility with China´s win-set. Compared to China, 
current interests of British private businesses and negative public opinion on closer 																																																								
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collaboration are less and less taken into account by politicians because options are 
constrained. The U.K.´s maneuvering room has decreased remarkably in recent years, 
forcing it to agree with arrangements and partners it might have rejected in the past.  
 
Domestic Leadership and Resulting Complexities in the International Arena 
Of all the leaders of China´s modern history, Hu Jintao´s overall achievements are 
often seen to make him the weakest president of all. Whilst insiders such as former 
Newsweek Beijing Bureau Chief and President of the Chinese Foreign 
Correspondent´s Club Melinda Liu initially connected Hu´s “unassertive approach”241 
to a potentially gracious leadership style, same observations made other observers 
worried about the leader´s strength in an incalculable domestic setting within 
China.242 As Joseph Nye highlights in his book Presidential Leadership and the 
Creation of the American Era, the potential of a leader´s legacy is often measured by 
categorizing him as either transactional or transformational politician.243 In retrospect 
Hu Jintao is most commonly put into the former camp of transactional leaders. Given 
China´s undoubtedly miraculous economic performance during his time in office one 
must wonder about the justifications behind such judgement. What sort of 
measurements can be taken to assess the chief of state´s power effectively and how it 
the result to be connected with energy politics? One possibility to investigate the 
leader´s domestic influence is to compare his performance to the second most 
important person in command. In the case of Hu Jintao´s term in office we have to 
take a look at his labor division with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Prime Minister at the 
time.  																																																								
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Amidst a rather low-spirited 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Wen Jiabao 
“injected a note of optimism.”244 Equally committed to represent his country´s agenda 
to find balance between growing economic performances and contributions to fight 
global warming. It was also Wen and not Hu who attended the 2009 Copenhagen 
Climate Summit. Back then, China´s image on the international stage was not as 
established as it is nowadays. Lack of Hu Jintao´s presence in the Copenhagen 
negotiations not only hinted at a surprisingly weak leader on top of an economic 
powerhouse. The composition of the Chinese delegate also embodied a reduced size 
of win-sets negotiable with China. However, as highlighted in Putnam´s two-level 
game theory, a superficially weaker position does not necessarily translate into 
diminished power over decision making by others.  
 
Ultimately, Wen Jiabao only spent less than 60 hours in the Danish capital whilst 
heads of the most developed countries persevered until the very end.245 After Wen´s 
sudden departure, reasoned with failing communication and lack of trust (the Chinese 
government accused Barack Obama in particular of making secret plans that 
disregarded conditions of less developed nations), the circle of meaningful Chinese 
negotiators began to shrank further. In 2009 China still held on tightly to its identity 
as a still developing country, leaving less tolerance for economically more advanced 
countries to dictate its course in climate change policies. Georgetown University´s 
Mark Habeeb and his book Power Tactics in International Negotiation: How Weak 
Nations Bargain with Strong Nations (1988) confirms Putnam´s view that seemingly 																																																								
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weaker position of country A leaves a stronger B and its allies not much choice other 
than finding a solution which is definitely within A´s win-set.246  
 
If China´s political elite aroused attention more because of absence rather presence at 
Copenhagen, the U.K.´s role in the game attracted attention with assertive leadership 
presence. Gordon Brown and former Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Ed Miliband, managed to perform as well attuned duo. For the two men 
Copenhagen gatherings became a platform to further promote ideas conceptualized in 
their national policy papers for the domestic UK Climate Change Act 2008.247 What 
was viewed by some critics at home as “economic suicidal”, became reason for 
euphoria in the camp of environmentalists.248 With the policy paper the United 
Kingdom became the first ever individual country to develop an extensive framework 
to combat climate change.  
 
As also discussed in Putnam´s writings, rigorous new policies often face resistance in 
the domestic context. This sort of scenario has also occurred during policy 
implementation efforts in the U.K. where certain interest groups divided public 
responses about the Climate Change Act. British leaders understood that resistance to 
Brown´s climate change policies could potentially be overthrown with approval of 
such undertakings by influential developed nations present in Copenhagen. There was 
hope for a more agreeable domestic win-set, enabled through support by the 
international community. Furthermore, Brown´s strategy exemplified some 
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diplomatic delicacy by inviting Energy Secretary Miliband as authoritative supporter, 
showing Britain´s commitment to global warming by dedication through relevant 
political staff attendance. Brown identified flaws in his personal power dynamics and 
lack of domestic support but made up for it with appropriate domestic political staff 
interacting with international allies.     
 
Even though for different reasons, both Hu Jintao as well as Gordon Brown shared a 
shortage of political solidness at the time of Copenhagen negotiations. However, the 
U.K. political leader and his entourage concealed difficulties with moralistic attitude 
towards those who didn´t agree on their course. Brown´s supporter Miliband was even 
bold enough to openly denounce China as “trying to hijack the Copenhagen Climate 
Deal.”249 The U.K.´s stronger overall standing in 2009 and similarity of goals with 
other developed nations allowed it to confidently express an accusatory tone opposite 
a China with much lower international recognition back then. Though Gordon Brown 
welcomed Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao during official state visits in 
early 2009 and the Second Financial Summit of G20 Leaders in London respectively, 
those meetings concentrated on shared economic win-sets instead of talks about the 
environment.250  
 
In summary the events of Copenhagen confirm validity of Putnam´s two-level game 
theory as China could hold on to one of the principles of international environmental 
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law, “common but differentiated responsibilities” with smaller win-set.251 Nowadays, 
behavior of the Chinese leadership is assertive. Xi Jinping has brought upon the start 
of a more characteristic leadership style, forming all trends in political, economic and 
social spheres - domestically and internationally. For example there is his current role 
in light of economic developments. Whilst we know of popular terms in the manner 
of “Thatcherism” and “Abenomics”, spectators of the present Chinese regime are all 
too familiar with “Xiconomics”. Whilst such terms do not stand for straight forward 
economic victory, they indicate how the economy is tightly controlled by an 
individual stateswoman or statesman. In contrast, even though the current Prime 
Minister Li Keqiang is a trained economist he is called “the weakest Chinese prime 
minister in decades.”252  
 
Though it was Hu Jintao, a Tsinghua University trained engineer, who introduced 
China´s Scientific Outlook on Development (even promoted in the widest corners of 
Xinjiang province) present green energy devolvements under Xi Jinping are now 
taken more serious by the international community.253 Current centralization under Xi 
counteracts previous Chinese trends where some educational specialization was 
needed to gain power over a certain strategic department. Whilst Hu Jintao was still 
preoccupied with problematic areas set in the domestic context, Xi Jinping is required 
to commit to a wider global agenda after years of Chinese economic growth. 
Comparing different aspects of the Chinese political elite present at the 2015 Paris 
Summit and the Copenhagen event in 2009 leaves one with a remarkable observation. 																																																								
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Whilst Chinese leadership strength was questioned with Hu Jintao´s absence and Wen 
Jiabao´s sudden departure, Xi Jinping himself represented the position of China in the 
French capital last year. In Copenhagen American President Obama felt humiliated 
when left with no choice but to negotiate with former Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei 
after Wen Jiabao´s departure. In 2015 the same President of the United States faced 
Xi Jinping - a government official with a strong aura and confidence to personally 
defend China´s agenda in the international context. In 2001 influential academic 
scholar David Lampton highlighted “changing patterns of elite” in China, allowing 
increasing dilution of power at the top level.254 Lampton based his argument on a 
growing trend of specialized expertise needed make it to the top of the government 
instead of pure relationships amongst the leaders and the next generation. This 
observation might be true to some extent after Deng Xiaoping´s reforms and the 
following leadership styles of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Now this observation must 
be revisited with the current developments in Beijing. Some scholars detect 
transformational qualities in the current Chinese President, reminding of Deng 
Xiaoping´s legacy.255   
 
There is surprisingly little academic research on the implications of presence or 
absence of presidents during international negotiations. Given the current revival of 
Putnam´s two-level game theory this leaves room to explore further. The summit in 
Paris showed points of contact between domestic and international win-sets can be 
very much guided by the heads of states during events of global significance. In the 
case of last year, the significance of Xi´s presence was further elevated with the 																																																								
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nature of his address. Though he spoke in the plural, the Chinese leader did not 
abstain from confronting ever-present quarrels evoked through traditional 
assumptions of political realism: 
 
“We should create a future of win-win cooperation, with each country making 
contribution to the best of its ability (...) reject the narrow-minded mentality of "zero 
sum game" (...), and assume more shared responsibilities for win-win outcomes”.256 
 
However, as Xi is now a much more confident leader compared to his predecessor he 
is much more vulnerable to criticism about his bold movements. Furthermore, the 
international community and the U.K. too, expects the Chinese president to keep 
promises made about fighting global warming. 
 
The final Copenhagen Accord and the decision making processes leading to it imply 
China´s solidarity with other BASIC nations as well as other less developed nations 
has ceased towards the end of negotiations. In 2009 China´s final win-set could not 
accommodate yet for needs of weaker states. Especially before and at the beginning 
of Copenhagen 2015 the union of AOSIS (alliance of small island states) applauded 
China´s support for increased financial injections by developed countries. AOSIS 
built “a discourse and leadership strategy around morality, uniting a broad coalition - 
including China.257 However, by the end it shows China´s potential gain from serving 
them was not large enough to keep the world´s most populous country firmly adhere 
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to some initial promises opposite strong negotiators like the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
A question worth dwelling on is whether the type of issue to be solved has an impact 
of a win-set flexibility. Global warming shares characteristics with terrorism and 
cyber security threats as all these issues need to be handled by more than one actor.  
Also, if global concerns such as climate change can change flexibility in win-sets, will 
this have an impact on decision making and relations in less problematic areas? One 
could argue that pressure to collaborate successfully leads to increased mutual 
understanding and trust. Strategic sectors such as the economy could benefit to certain 
extents if there were less doubts about intellectual property rights due to enhanced 
levels of communication in international meetings. Certainly in the case David 
Cameron´s U.K and Xi Jinping´s China, the combination of certain domestic 
shortcomings and mutual task to handle a global issue has promoted stronger bilateral 
ties.  
 
Objectives for Collaboration on Carbon Capture and Storage 
 
In recent years, there has been increased attention on potential clean energy 
collaboration between the United States and China. Given America´s advanced 
scientific expertise and China´s desire for more updated technology, collaboration 
makes sense. However, despite awareness about ongoing climate change, fears about 
intellectual property theft and general espionage prevent realization of opportunities 
between the two countries.258 Intellectual property theft, loss in economic prospects 
and wider security issues also concern British politicians and business people but 																																																								
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negative suspicions are decreasing as dependency on China grows. The following 
section highlights again why cooperation between China and the U.K. in clean 
technology is desirable given respective domestic economic and financial conditions 
in the Xi and Cameron leadership era. It is advocated that there must be partnership in 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) capacity building in particular as China´s output 
levels of greenhouse gas through coal consumption are still overwhelmingly 
dangerous. Immediate solution is required. About 90% of China´s carbon dioxide 
emissions are fossil fuel based and this proportion is not likely to change soon due to 
relatively low costs of domestic resources.259 Prestigious research institutes in Great 
Britain with their advances knowledge become an attractive partner for China whilst 
closer collaboration with Chinese state-owned enterprises, private businesses and 
scientists can improve relations from a soft power perspective. As the U.K. is 
threatened by financial bottlenecks and China fears growing security threats (most 
prominently in the Asia-Pacific region), exchanges based on education and research 
collaboration may be less politicized - improving soft power relations smoothly 
through understandable need. As they counteract economic, geo-strategic and 
environmental concerns together, they also serve a greater purpose of combating 
global warming. This side effect can transform into a major development, shaking up 
prevailing power structures in the international political system. Newly found 
comradeship amongst China and the U.K. builds future negotiation power opposite 
other major developed countries from the E.U. and America. 
 
Overview about the Near-Zero-Emissions Coal (NZEC) Plant Initiative   
An important step towards cleaner energy involves carbon capture and storage. The 																																																								
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bilateral 2006 China-UK Near Zero Emissions Coal Initiative was established as part 
of a larger 2005 EU-China NZEC Agreement.260 The overall NZEC roadmap is 
divided into three different stages. The first phase, introduced by two separate but 
complementing Memoranda of Understanding, is primarily concerned about 
“knowledge sharing and capacity building” between the E.U. and China as well as the 
U.K. and China.261 Two paths of feasibility studies were backed through a 2.6 million 
euros E.U. budget for COACH (Cooperation Action with CCS China-EU) and 3.5 
million pounds for the NZEC initiative associated with the U.K.262 The fact that 
Britain got involved with China together with the E.U. and as a separate entity/ 
individual financial contribution, shows there was substantial commitment from 
British decision makers in the beginning. Furthermore, official sources such as the 
current website of the European Commission announce that the second phase for 
NZEC was intended for creating site-specific designs, particularly in view of 
constructions in a Chinese setting.263 Final phase three was designated for the building 
and usage of the first demonstration plant with CCS technology by 2020.  
 
Domestic Issues in the U.K and the Effect on NZEC 
At first NZEC received much welcoming amongst all parties involved.264 However, as 
2009 correspondences between British politicians from the European Union 
Committee responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defense and Development Policy and the 
former U.K. Minister for Energy and Climate Change reveal actual project 
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developments could not keep up with early enthusiasm.265 Until today there are 
various shortcomings, including those of domestic financial nature. Failed completion 
of phase two with the designing for specific sites (first successful executions were 
planned for the period 2008-10) underline an ever decreasing chance of completion 
on the final phase with concrete constructions (originally said to be finished by 
2020).266  
 
A big factor preventing conclusion of the project has to do with inadequate monetary 
resources from the European Union and the United Kingdom alike. Considering that 
NZEC was supposed to take-off around the time of the 2007/08 Financial Crisis, 
delay is understandable to a certain degree. Doubts arise as there is some form of 
incompatibility between initial promises from developed countries such as the U.K. 
and subsequent accusations at the Copenhagen 2009 UN Climate Change Conference. 
The world community, richer nations in particular, expected China to take a bigger 
role in climate change mitigations and yet, same parties failed to secure resources that 
would support China´s developments towards a greener future. Prominent voices of 
the U.K.´s political scene especially blamed China to behave like an unaccountable 
and irresponsible economic powerhouse.267 As previously seen in climate negotiations 
like those taking place in Kyoto 1992, there have always dissonances because of 
different expectations and varying degrees of legally binding agreements.268 When 
developed countries get angry about China´s non-binding approach at international 
climate change conferences, the question must be asked how much they should expect 
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if they have trouble abiding to their own promises. In the case of the NZEC initiative 
and agreements between China and the U.K. in particular, a continuously shrinking 
British national budget slowed down progress significantly. Compared to Gordon 
Brown´s time in office, David Cameron´s government had to deal with an astonishing 
reduction of its political win-set - affecting energy policies in both national and 
international dimensions. 
 
The following chart 
illustrates the E.U.´s green 
energy contributions from a 
few years ago in 2013 and 
individual country goals for 
2020.   
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Source: “Three European Countries Have Already Hit Their 2020 Renewable Energy Goals,” last 
modified May 11, 2016, http://qz.com/359415/three-european-countries-have-already-hit-their-2020-
renewable-energy-goals/. 
 
 
As we can see above, with a clean energy share of just 5.1% the U.K. was amongst 
the weakest European green energy contributors in 2013. Ambitions of a 15% green 
energy proportion for 2020 signals there is not any significant commitment to 
renewables in the close future. This is an astonishing situation because the U.K. has 
been of the biggest advocates of immediate carbon dioxide reductions within the 
European Union. With the recent vote for Brexit, it can well be true that not even 15% 
green energy shares are achievable anymore with diminishing financial support from 
the E.U. Receiving 24% of an overall sum of 7.2 billion euros, the U.K. has been the 
greatest beneficiary of the European Investment Bank´s Climate Awareness Bond 
Project, allowing it to allocate resources for more sustainable energy.269 China´s 
investment into energy alternatives on the other hand are positively striking. The 
country is currently the world´s biggest backer due to agendas formulated in the 12th 
Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, allowing assignments of more 																																																								
269 “Brexit May Lose U.K Billions in Funding for Climate, Renewables,” last modified July 21, 2016, 
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than 400 billion dollars for clean energy within the period 2012-2015.270 Over the 
years, China´s expertise in clean energy has become developed enough so that it is 
able to pursue goals in this matter without closer dependency on developed nations. 
What China needs now is strong collaboration to navigate through concrete 
environmental issue caused by continuous coal consumption. At the moment the U.K 
may not be interested or able to develop its renewable energy sector. Instead it may 
contribute tackling global warming through assistance to China when its scientific 
community pushes boundaries in carbon capture and storage partnership. 
 
Financial struggles of both the E.U. and the U.K. may prevent them from immediate 
investment into plants with CCS technology but it would be great loss for all 
participants if the NZEK initiative was completely stopped for monetary reasons. 
Financial issues can have a great impact on the political agenda on the national level, 
including financial allocations to international projects, but global warming tests 
delicate distinctions between national and international political spheres anyhow. 
Surely, if the U.K. and other countries are mostly limited to research collaboration 
with China instead of direct investment into coal plants sites, economic gains may not 
look as promising. However, perspective of long-term environmental damage alone 
should motivate the E.U. and the U.K. to cooperate with China nevertheless.  
 
Policy Implications 
If the NZEC initiative would have been more successful so far, discussions on climate 
change responsibilities might have been less critical. The European Union and the 
U.K. provide legal frameworks which are satisfyingly lawful to most extents. Though 																																																								
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this is a favorable condition, too bureaucratic mechanisms hinder important 
developments requiring quick actions. As individual European countries struggle to 
fund CCS research in cooperation with China, it is not certain when the NZEK 
venture can be completed. How would progress in capacity building look like if 
countries like the U.K. would have been flexible enough to change the nature of their 
interests? China’s financial resources should be sufficient to substitute for some 
financial gaps and need for cleaner air is more than ever existing. If the U.K. had 
valued more its own strengths in research facilities instead of chasing economic gains, 
China might be a substantially cleaner country by now.   The British Geological 
Survey, a natural environment research council, epitomizes the meaningful role 
British research organizations could play. Firstly, it produces specialized reports with 
much depth. Talking about potential carbon dioxide storage sites by the water, it goes 
as far as to write about “potential chemical interactions of injected CO2 with the 
surrounding rocks”.271 With China´s various geological conditions, such knowledge is 
useful. In the case of Chinese Guangdong province for example there is a potential 
match between information discussed by the British Geological Survey and 
Guangdong´s own energy saving roadmap. As China´s economic power motor, this 
part of the country produces particularly high greenhouse gas outputs. Situated by a 
large coastal strip, reliable content about carbon storage sites suited for this geological 
landscape is necessary.272 Nevertheless, as China´s provincial governments have an 
important say in strategic areas that affect them directly, close collaboration with 
Chinese scientists is needed too to allow sustainable developments within the country.  
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The situation in Guangdong reveals local knowledge building is unavoidable. British 
scientists can build a bridge between foreigners and Chinese government officials. 
Knowledge should be digestible for all relevant parties and academics from the U.K. 
can deepen their appreciation about the other side. The British Geological Survey also 
worked on the U.N.´s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special 
Report where carbon capture was an important theme.273 Thus, agencies like the 
British Geological Survey could help establish closer bonds between all important 
players. No matter if it is British government leaders and business communities or 
Chinese scientists, high-level provincial politicians or even a supranational institution 
like the U.N. Through British Geological Survey these actors can come all together in 
the name of scientific progress and more successful climate change mitigation. 
Individual win-set ambitions become slightly less the center of attention, making 
room for overlapping agendas. 
 
Geopolitical Concerns and the Need for Growth in Soft Power  
Collaboration could not only imply better relations between high level politicians and 
the business community amongst the two countries. It can also affect evaluations 
between people to people. As China became a huge factor for the realization of future 
U.K. nuclear plant developments through Xi Jinping´s state visit last year, there have 
been countless outcries by the wider U.K. public.  Commentaries such as one found in 
The Guardian reflected popular opinions at the time: “This nuclear power deal (...) is 
one of the maddest ever struck”.274 Especially in democratic states, public opinion has 
always been an important factor. Since a positive vote for Brexit especially it has 																																																								
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become clear that people´s opinion can become a game-changing force that influences 
both domestic and international political atmospheres. Especially now when the 
relationship between the U.K. and the rest of the E.U. it’s likely to deteriorate, the 
U.K.´s affiliation with other strong partners is more crucial than ever.  
 
U.K. support for updated CCS technology in China does not only contribute to a 
better climate on the bilateral level. If China makes significant reductions in carbon 
dioxide excretions, those accomplishments lead to increased positive perceptions 
amongst other members of the international community. Fruitful bilateral partnership 
between the U.K. and China likely possesses ability to transform power relations in 
multiple dimensions. Previous rivalry between the U.S. and China can be substituted 
by a more mutually dependent energy friendship which, in the best case scenario, can 
first revolutionize thinking about collaborations in the energy transformation 
processes but also intergovernmental partnerships in general.  
 
There could have been some sort of more substantial U.S.-U.K. partnership regarding 
research and capacity building for a more sustainable energy landscape. Often, 
potential for cooperation is dependent if countries involved share enough similarities 
between each other´s win-sets. Besides telling resemblances in their governmental 
systems and political agendas, the U.S. and the U.K. are unmistakable backers of 
clean energy on the world stage. Yet, their own bilateral efforts are surprisingly old 
compared to some other recent international developments. According to online 
statements of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the U.S.-U.K. Collaboration on 
Fossil Fuel Energy Research and Development is the last substantial cooperation with 
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the U.K. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).275  As part of a greater 
U.S.-UK Memorandum of Understanding concerning energy, established in 2000, the 
Implementing Arrangement of U.S.-U.K. Collaboration in Fossil Energy Research 
and Development from 2003 seems outdated compared to latest partnerships between 
individual U.S. and U.K. stakeholders with other countries.276 The Implementing 
Arrangement was signed when Tony Blair was still U.K. Prime Minister but even a 
political change with Gordon Brown and David Cameron as heads of state did not 
lead to pushing developments into more productive directions. In other words, even 
though overall American and British financial conditions and scientific capabilities 
were more advanced than China´s to some degree, there was insufficient interest to 
get things going together. Instead, both developed nations expected China´s win-set to 
accommodate the rest of the world´s call for a greener environment in Copenhagen 
2009. Similarly to the NZEC initiative, paper documents about the U.S.-U.K. 
collaboration on fossil fuel energy reveal plans for “(...) joint planning and exchange 
of information and personnel in the field of cleaner coal technology, (...), including 
clean coal research, development, and demonstration of new technologies”.277 As both 
the U.S.-U.K partnership as well as the E.U./U.K. involvement with NZEC have 
shown, no particular member of the developed world has sincerely helped to tackle 
China´s dangerous levels of carbon dioxide emissions by CCS. Instead, reciprocal 
assignments of guilt for climate catastrophe have been rising throughout the years.  
 
As long as there are geopolitical tensions with China like the conflict in the South 
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China Sea and China´s own carbon dioxide emissions are not significantly reduced to 
allow better air conditions, it is unlikely that Chinese investments into foreign clean 
energy projects are genuinely respected. Most of the times Chinese foreign direct 
investments into Europe are directly associated with state-owned enterprises.278 At 
present, any form of Chinese money flow targeting the E.U. is simultaneously a 
political affair. An article published in the Energy Policy journal last year reveals how 
Chinese investment in the European energy sector illustrates telling connections 
between the nature of the investor and the receiver of the money.279 With Brexit about 
to happen, it is quite likely that demands of Chinese investors and money recipients 
from the U.K. are increasingly complementary. Contrary to previous periods of acute 
security crisis, especially during the Cold War, there is less reason to attune win-sets 
between the U.S. and the U.K. At present, there is no signal that the U.K. is a reliable 
endorser of American foreign policies in the South China Sea. As the U.K. keeps on 
losing ties with strategic partners, its relationship with China can become of great 
help to avoid further decline of influence on the world stage.  
 
Final Summary of Gains through Extended Partnership 
Whilst NZEK was implemented, China also worked on national carbon capture and 
storage research on its own. Chinese decision makers showed certain efforts which 
would provide them with preparation for partnership with their informative U.K. 
counterparts. Overall the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in 
particular played a crucial role in these preparations. As they initiated the Scientific 
and Technological Actions on Climate Change in 2007, they stated similar goals to 																																																								
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those outlined by official NZEK documents. MOST´s official appeal on carbon 
capture capacity growth included wish to “develop key technologies (...), design the 
technical roadmap (...), engineering and technical demonstration projects”280. A 
bilateral undertaking like NZEK motivates actors on both sides to grow in their 
capacities. In this instance, the U.K. has interest to prove competence so that is can 
secure future partnerships and financial support from China for other projects. China 
too will have to make adequate efforts as British foreign expertise is doomed for 
failure if relevant Chinese parties do not act the way it is needed. Handling carbon 
capture and storage brings upon many complexities. If educational levels and 
perceptivity of Chinese scientists were not similarly developed as those of British 
colleagues, then how would they process and apply newly found discoveries? A group 
of scholars from both countries have highlighted that no matter how much insight 
there can be acquired with help from the U.K., only Chinese professionalism found in 
its own domestic setting can bring the most successful outcome possible: “The key is 
for (Chinese) power plant operators, oil and gas companies and other industries to 
gain experience with all aspects of the process through construction, commissioning 
and operation of a large-scale CCS unit”. 
 
China has an interest to keep coal as major means of energy. Even though its 
manufactured goods are not as high in demand anymore due to a slowing global 
economy, plenty of energy is still needed. Furthermore, unemployment because of a 
shrinking coal industry bears risk of social unrest. As Chinese society is more aware 
about health concerns, speedy cooperation with helpful companions is almost 
inevitable. In Putnam´s two-level game theory this all translates into domestic 																																																								
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pressures which must be soothed accordingly. British expertise on carbon capture and 
storage allows the continuation of the Chinese coal industry and thus, hopefully a 
good enough level of economic output to bring China closer to its goal to become a 
developed country. To China, internal affairs still take priority on the political agenda 
but balancing satisfying domestic economic growth together with tackling of global 
climate change is progressively important with the wish to be a respected superpower.  
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Security and Military Relations 
 
An area of focus that must be accounted for when considering state relations is that of 
the relationship that exists between two states on a security and military front. This 
may not always have application that will reshape the understanding of how two 
states interact as some states will not have any engagement with another due to 
limited resources, lack of political or economic interest in an area, or other reasons 
that negate the need for two countries to either conflict or collaborate on a security or 
military front. The factor that perhaps has the most influence is the actual states 
involved themselves. Factors such as geographic location, resource competition, 
strategic positioning all play into how a state will ultimately engage their neighbors, 
but the state themselves drives the influence the other factors have on decision 
making and outcomes. States with military capability, history, and the ability to 
pursue actions with public support will be much more likely to engage in conflict than 
a state that lacks military tradition, capability, and public support or stomach for such 
actions. Military cooperation might also exist depending on the region. Regionalized 
groups comprised of security forces from multiple states such as the African Union’s 
peacekeeping arm exist not just for the sake of cooperation, but to deal with very real 
security threats including states with weak borders and with conflict leading to 
fighting across borders and mass migration of refugees. On the other hand you have 
states that are cooperating through various partnerships and initiatives even if direct 
security links may not be evident. Likely there is still mutual interest in the ability to 
maintain a stable environment in a state as that will translate to the regional and 
international level. 
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With regards to China and the United Kingdom, traditional military and security ties, 
for example engagements with each other in any form of conflict or strong, publicized 
links between the two states’ military and security infrastructures, are limited at least 
with regards to information available to the public. The United Kingdom of course 
has historical military ties related to conflict with the Chinese, but this is so long ago 
during the time in which the United Kingdom and its claimed empire spread across 
the world that it is mostly irrelevant when considering modern interaction between the 
two states’ militaries. The United Kingdom no longer claims the empire of old and 
while it does have modern, developed military capabilities demonstrated through 
deployments to various areas of the world over the past few decades, it is not making 
itself actively present in the Asia Pacific region as the United States is and therefore 
does not engage in any form of conflict with the Chinese in the region. The 
international focus on the Asia Pacific region looking specifically at conflict and 
potential conflict is focused mostly in two areas that involve China. One is the 
ongoing situation on the Korean Peninsula in which Russia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and others are all involved in 
various capacities in monitoring and attempting to contain what is perceived by most 
to be an ongoing threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its 
current leader, Kim Jong Un. The second major focus that involves the Chinese is 
related to ongoing territorial and water usage claims in the South China Sea; an 
ongoing series of events that has spanned years and involves not only the United 
States and China, but Vietnam, Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei, and Malaysia. 
 
Of these two major security focuses involving the Chinese in the Asia Pacific right 
now, the United Kingdom is involved only in the focus on the Democratic People’s 
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Republic of Korea and the potential security threat they pose to the greater region of 
East Asia. This involvement isn’t by way of physical presence, but rather on the 
diplomatic front through the United Kingdom’s permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. This depicts a picture of the relationship between China and the United 
Kingdom as being limited on the security and military front, at least through direct 
involvement with each other, and would then lead some to assume that the United 
Kingdom would surely follow traditional policy goals of the United States in the 
region as the United States and United Kingdom have been closely allied and 
mutually involved in military operations for some time, both through the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, and through direct cooperation and coalition 
involvement that has led to the two committing military forces to fighting side by side 
in numerous conflicts, though this is certainly changing in a new landscape post-
Iraq281. To simply assume this is to be the case for all involvement across the world, 
however, would perhaps be shortsighted as the mutual activities on the security and 
military front between the United Kingdom and the United States have not been 
largely focused on the Asia Pacific region and have in fact been much more focused 
on the Middle East and Eurasia through conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, North 
Africa to include Libya, and Europe with threats faced by radicalized people living 
within European and British borders282 
 
This ultimately means that the focus must lay elsewhere when trying to examine this 
relationship. It isn’t so simplistic as to suggest that there just is no relationship. 
Rather, it would lend to an idea that the relationship isn’t found in conventional 																																																								
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means of conflict between militaries and battles or alliances surrounding territories, 
but driven by other factors that can build a relationship between states. Much of this 
section will focus on what is believed to be one of the chief alternatives to traditional 
military engagement that is connecting these two states at the security and military 
level: the sale and export of commodities from the United Kingdom to China. 
Specifically, the commodities that will be examined have been classified to fall into 
one of two categories. The first category indicates the commodity has a military 
purpose in use and application. The second is a dual-use category in which the 
commodities in question could be used for purposed that support military purpose, but 
could also be used for alternative purposes and are not categorized as military 
equipment that could potentially blocked by convention surrounding export control. 
 
As Hu Jintao’s reign lasted from 2002 to 2012 with the transition occurring over the 
backend of 2012 and 2013 and with Xi Jinping having been in power since, the data 
that will be examined will run for the same duration of 24 months when examining 
both United Kingdom exports to China during the rule of Hu Jintao as well as Xi 
Jinping. The data set being examined for Hu Jintao’s period will run from March 
2011 to March 2013. The data set for Xi Jinping, from March 2013 to March 2015. 
Trying to perform a side-by-side analysis will inherently have a few flaws that can 
and should be identified before going further. For one, the landscape of the 
international system is constantly changing as are the dynamics playing out within a 
state at the domestic level. To try and perform a one for one analysis simply will not 
reflect the same variables. Also worthy of mention is that the data set being examined 
related to Hu Jintao’s rule relates to a period of him winding down his role. Most 
likely the transition was well underway behind closed doors before the official public 
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handoff of power to Xi Jinping and so it is possible that the data may reflect a portion 
of time in which transition was already underway and is not a true reflection of one or 
the other’s policy effects. On the other side of the same situation, we are still in the 
first five years of Xi Jinping’s rule and the data that is available could account for the 
period of March, 2013 when he assumed the leadership role to March 2015, in an 
effort to match the timespan being analyzed in Hu Jintao’s reign as well because 2016 
data has not been made available for consumption by the public at this time. 
Much of the military and defense relationship between the UK and China can be 
discussed in terms of the UK and China’s relationship with United States foreign 
policy objectives or in relation to United Nations collaborative efforts, an 
organization that the United States headquarters and contributes significantly to in 
terms of funding. While this has remained fairly consistent from Hu Jintao’s period of 
leadership to Xi Jinping’s, much has also been made of Jinping’s recent visit to 
London and what that could mean for the future of UK-China relations, though it isn’t 
clear what this will mean specifically for the security communities in both countries. 
Looking past the surface of their relationship in the security sector, one that seems to 
be defined by relations with the United States, this section will explore linkages 
between the UK and China in the arms and defense trade in an attempt to better 
understand what is being procured, by who and why. Given the nature of the security 
work, there is likely much more happening at a less-visible level with agents, be it 
individuals or organizations that have little to no obligation to openly discuss their 
relationship in any formal, documented capacity. This information might help shed 
light on the true nature of the existing relationship, and through a better understanding 
of the information, better predictions might be made about the future of the two 
country’s relationship in the security realm. The data should also reveal if there are 
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real changes in the relationship between the two countries that can be observed from 
Hu Jintao’s time in power to Xi Jinping’s. 
 
The data being accessed is coming from a non-profit organization named “Campaign 
against the Arms Trade.” It should be noted that they are not the original source of the 
data, but rather are compiling the information from official UK government reports 
and statistics and making it available online for research and analytical purposes. The 
Campaign against the Arms Trade has organizational goals that are quite ambitious to 
say the least. They list priorities as stopping “…the procurement or export of arms 
where they might exacerbate conflict, support aggression, or increase tension, support 
an oppressive regime or undermine democracy, or threaten social welfare through the 
level of military spending.283” This would mean their priorities ultimately can be 
summed up to be one focus of stopping the procurement or export of arms as their 
caveats seem to be all encompassing for what the trading of arms and other military 
commodities are used for. This potential bias should be offset by the source of the 
data and the raw availability of the information contained without organizational 
judgement being passed through summaries and analysis. 
 
The tables below represent the data sets discussed above and are labeled appropriately 
for comparison: 
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Figure 1:  Dual Use Exports to China, March 2011 to March 2013284 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Dual Use Exports to China, March 2013 to March 2015285 
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Figure 3:  Military Use Exports to China, March 2011 to March 2013286 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Military Use Exports to China, March 2013 to March 2015287 
 
 
 
What is interesting from the data represented above in Figure 1 through Figure 4 is 
that low-spending in both dual-use commodities as well as military commodities 
remained fairly consistent for a “minimum threshold” of spending occurring each 
year. For the dual-use commodities, the lowest spending month of the year remained 
between 7 and 7.5 million GBP. For the military-use category, the low-spend month 																																																								
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remained between 300 to 400 thousand GBP. Both had an outlier with the dual-use 
spending seeing lowest spending month nearly double the other years in 2011 and 
with 2013 having its low-spend month outlier significantly less than average at just 
under 200,000 GBP. 
 
The high end is less consistent across years with the lowest of the four high-spend 
months on dual-use commodities falling to 2011 and the highest following in 2012 at 
over twice the high-spend found in both 2013 and 2014. Military-grade exports 
remained consistent in three of the four years examined with regards to highest-
spending month of the year, all hovering around 5 million GBP. The major outlier, 
and it truly is a major outlier not just in the sense of the yearly high comparisons, but 
when looking at military exports from the United Kingdom to China across all four 
years, each month, is that of 2013’s military commodity exports. This total is just 
about 51 million GBP in products that were provided to China and is on the heels of 
Xi Jinping assuming power, occurring only one month after formally becoming 
President and only a few months after becoming head of the Communist Party. 
The data seems to suggest more consistent big spending on military imports from the 
UK during Hu Jintao’s period of time being examined and a fair amount of 
expenditure on dual-use imports with one major month with over 400 million GBP in 
imports during the 2012-2013 timeframe. Xi Jinping’s data looks at big spending 
immediately after assuming office on military imports and consistent big spending on 
dual-use imports throughout the time. The data doesn’t offer much in the way of 
insight into the relationship between China and the United Kingdom on a military and 
security front except to make clear that business is business and has been continuing 
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to respond to the needs of China, with some months much more spending-intensive 
than others. 
 
The information regarding the trading of security and defense technology discussed 
above also raises several questions regarding how involved the governments are and 
at what levels as well as how much British and Chinese nationals know about this 
market. To give everyone the benefit of the doubt from the start would assume that 
British and Chinese governments would support legitimate trade opportunities that 
exist between the countries, even in industries that are defense and security-centric. 
After all, China wouldn’t be alone in acquiring equipment from the British as the UK 
is a global leader in surveillance technology and a proponent of methods of force 
intended to be non-lethal, though the British have sold many lethal arms as well288. If 
this were to be the case, the Chinese would be working under the assumption that the 
procurement of such equipment would not cause significant disturbance at the 
domestic or the international level and the British would be, more or less, hands-off in 
any transactional dealings, but remaining present in an oversight capacity through 
export control. 
 
Assumptions would also have to be made about the general populations of both 
countries as well in this playout, however these assumptions are more likely to have 
factual basis than the aforementioned assumptions regarding the governments of both 
countries; the previous paragraph is highly unlikely on all counts given the serious 
nature with which both states take their presence and action on the international level. 
Far more likely are very calculated decisions designed to have specific benefit and 																																																								
288 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/british-government-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-yemen-
3-billion-bombs-missiles-war-crimes-houthi-a7157856.html 
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impact. This becomes even more likely a scenario when considering export controls 
in place for goods deemed to be strategic in nature. 
 
In fact, the United Kingdom’s own official guidance available to the public, captured 
in “Detailed Guidance” pertaining to “Embargoes and Sanctions on China” on their 
www.gov.uk site, states: 
“Almost all national governments in the world control the export of goods for various 
reasons depending on the nature and destinations of the proposed export. The export 
of strategic goods and technology in particular, are controlled because of various 
reasons, including: 
§ Concerns about internal repression, regional instability and 
other human rights violations 
§ Concerns about the development of weapons of mass 
destruction 
§ Foreign policy and international treaty commitments including 
as a result of the imposition of European Union (EU) or United 
Nations (UN) trade sanctions or arms embargoes 
§ National and collective security of the UK and its allies 
 
There is currently a partial arms embargo in force on China. This is partially imposed 
by the EU, and has also been implemented in UK law.”289 
 
 
 
																																																								
289 https://www.gov.uk/guidance/arms-embargo-on-china 
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This statement, one which would suggest both the ability and the need to be 
accountable from a moral perspective within the United Kingdom to the domestic 
population to at least some degree, plays into a much more complicated picture when 
examining the data related to the export of both military and dual-use goods to China. 
Of the four bullet points highlighted in what is essentially a statement of UK policy, 
arguments could be made for China satisfying the requirements of at least three of 
them. The first bullet point, referring to concerns of repression, instability and human 
rights issues, might ultimately be the one that allows countries such as the UK the 
ability to traverse what is essentially a diplomatic tightrope being driven by industry 
on one side and a large state consumer on the other. Two of the three issues 
mentioned in the bullet, internal repression and human rights violations, are certainly 
hot-topic issues when West-Chinese relations are brought up in the international 
media. The UK government faced criticism for police reaction to some protestors 
during Xi Jinping’s visit to London and a British human rights commission detailed 
alleged human rights abuses conducted by China in a recommendation to rethink 
relations290. What could be argued is China’s leverage in this situation is the regional 
instability factor. While of course China is involved in a number of spats regionally, 
from South China Sea conflict that recently resulted in a third party arbitrator utilized 
through UN convention by the Philippines291 to continuing skirmishes between naval 
and fishing vessels as well as other incidents between China and Vietnam292, the one 
that gives them leverage is their ability to represent themselves as a chief container of 
the North Korea problem. 
 																																																								
290 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/uk-should-rethink-china-friendship-over-human-
rights-tory-group-urges 
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States involved in the regional security dilemma surrounding the ill-named 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea must always consider the key strategic role 
China has been able to assume, effectively containing acts fueling instability to 
prevent chaos in the region and gaining diplomatic credibility and credential in the 
process. This isn’t to say that China doesn’t have a sizable interest in maintaining a 
certain degree of calm in the region. The isolated, impoverished neighbor of China 
has a population of 25 million people293 and judging by the strategic deployment of 
Chinese military personnel294, they would like to ensure any crisis occurring inside 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is contained as much as possible within 
the borders, or at least not extending into Chinese borders. The potential refugee crisis 
that could occur should chaos erupt or the government fall would directly affect China 
as routes to the South are heavily militarized and dangerous with unmanned lethal 
technology such as landmines present throughout the border region295. Better than 
having to deal with such a potential catastrophe is to prevent it from occurring in the 
first place, hence the need for China to maintain a sense of status quo, both on the 
domestic, within the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and on the international 
level, pertaining to potential conflict between the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and other forces such as the United States and the Republic of Korea. 
While not nearly as involved as say the United States or the Republic of Korea, at 
least in the sense of what many might assume to mean “involved” (for the purposes of 
this discussion, the general assumption would be military capacity in the region that is 
directly engaged or has the ability to engage another state and has adversarial policy 
goals), the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the United Nations Security 																																																								
293 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
294 http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/04/20/China-deploying-troops-along-North-
Korea-border/9411461165635/ 
295 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/11/world/asia/north-korea-placed-mines-that-maimed-2-south-
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Council and remains active in issues and negotiations pertaining to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea. In many ways this helps to negate some of the outcome 
associated with a traditional analysis of British foreign policy pertaining to security 
and military; one that has been very much in line with United States and NATO 
policy with regards to actual commitment and troop deployment. Instead of being tied 
to what is increasingly becoming a divided region with many allegiances split 
between China and the United States, the United Kingdom is able to utilize its 
position as one of only five permanent security council members to effect change and 
exert influence in a manner that it must surely enjoy while it lasts. While the United 
Nations is not by any means an end all, be all for resolving conflict or imposing law 
and order on the international community, it does offer a unique opportunity to drive 
policy initiatives and make international statements for states that may not be able to 
produce comparable military forces to major powers such as China and the United 
States. This is not to say that the United Kingdom does not have military capability. 
Some would even argue that head-to-head, while vastly outnumbered in comparison, 
the United Kingdom’s quality and advanced nature of military technology and 
capabilities would level the playing field between the two states and in certain 
strategic outcomes might even be able to overcome the Chinese military296, though 
this sort of analysis is heavily based on a number of circumstantial requirements and 
outcomes that may never be satisfied. 
 
Nonetheless, this role as a permanent member of the Security Council allows for 
states such as China and the United Kingdom to build relationships with each other 
even when finding themselves on opposite sides of Security Council voting and 
																																																								
296 http://www.businessinsider.com/why-britains-military-could-beat-china-2014-1 
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working together on joint-initiatives. United Nations-sanctioned peacekeeping 
operations, something China has very much been involved in over the years of both 
Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. In 2015, Xi Jinping pledged 8,000 additional Chinese 
peacekeeping forces and $100 million US dollars to peacekeeping efforts and 
supporting African Union efforts on the African continent297, an action that certainly 
cements his commitment to a serious Chinese presence in the United Nations both on 
the policy and peacekeeping fronts. This relationship building is evident in examples 
between the United States and China as both had interests in maintaining and 
promoting peace and development in South Sudan. In China’s case, it is one of the 
biggest investors in South Sudan’s oil fields, but in dual-purpose, the commitment to 
peacekeeping efforts across the African continent made it even easier to work 
alongside the United States on mediation efforts and to commit a small contingency 
of peacekeeping forces as approximately 700 were in April of 2015.298 
 
Though China and the United Kingdom are two very different places with vastly 
different geography, populations, and culture to name but a few items, the underlying 
theoretical approach taken to understanding decisions made at the international level 
remain the same. Differences in application will exist as each state and government 
has unique features that determine the role of the people in the greater decision 
making process, but they are nonetheless guided by the same theoretical principles. 
For example, the United Kingdom functions through the establishment of Parliament 
which is comprised of elected representatives that are accountable to the people they 
represent in their home districts. This compares to China where elected officials claim 																																																								
297 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1862255/chinese-president-xi-jinping-
makes-us1-billion-pledge 
298 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/xi-jinping-visit/china-
surprisesu-n-with-100-million-and-thousands-of-troops-for-peacekeeping 
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localized offices through various systems that, for the purposes of this paper, won’t 
contribute to what is being examined here. The central decision making is being made 
by the leaders of the Communist Party and domestic issues can be met with a level of 
force and blackout that would be unacceptable to the UK populace. This isn’t to say 
that Chinese citizens are content and oblivious with decisions made at the domestic 
and international, but rather to suggest that they are less able to hold the central 
government accountable for decisions made as the representatives are not elected and 
as control of the media and internet in terms of what makes it out to the masses is 
vested in the Chinese government. 
 
Unfortunately without a strong foundation to begin with between the two states 
grounded in either military conflict or cooperation, limited mostly to interaction 
through the United Nations as both members sit on the Security Council, and with 
data indicating fairly consistent trade of dual-use and military use commodities with 
the exception of a few outliers present under both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping’s periods 
analyzed, it is difficult to tell if British-Chinese security and military relations have 
changed notably one way or the other. The focus would seem to be on dual-use 
commodities under Xi Jinping, but while perhaps indicating there is more business to 
be had by British exporters, it also suggests Xi Jinping has focus on the Chinese 
domestic population. 
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Conclusion 
 
Changing relations between China and the U.K. is a reflection of respective 
alterations in their domestic conditions as much as it is a sign for shifting power 
dynamics in the international political system overall. Outside influences on two 
countries are primarily represented by on-going struggles of the U.S. and some other 
developed European countries. Hu Jintao´s task to find balance between solution 
approaches to national disturbances opposite international affairs was less demanding 
than the prevailing circumstances in Xi Jinping´s leadership period. Not only China 
and the U.K but also the rest of the world has great complexities to deal with at the 
moment. As those irritations not straight-forwardly or solely related to China and the 
U.K. have been rising both in America and Europe (i.e. war in the Middle and the 
Financial Crisis), the U.S. in particular has developed an increasingly offensive 
foreign policy towards China because it feels threat to its identity as a global 
hegemon.  Even though China might not have wanted to invest too much energy into 
its relation with the U.K. in the beginning, other prominent international actors have 
encouraged this behavior through their own economic and security concerns. Positive 
developments between China and the U.K. are based on increasingly complementary 
characteristics, conditioned by domestic, bilateral as well as international affairs. 
International relations theory by definition tries to create different boundaries between 
political actors and reasons for decision making mechanisms but sometimes these 
boundaries are too artificial. Especially in today´s globalization, there is no neat line 
anymore between domestic and international developments. Even though Putnam´s 
two-level game theory does provide a useful analytical framework to understand the 
driving forces behind changing China-U.K. relations, distinction between the 
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domestic and international political spheres is slightly artificial in the current context. 
Just as strict lines between different actors and mechanisms must be lowered because 
of trends in political reality, theories of international relations too should mirror some 
more flexibility and openness for required adjustments.   
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